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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING COMBAT RELATED PYSCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN
VETERANS: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT BASED MORALITY
SEPTEMBER, 2011
RAMILA USOOF, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PERADENIYA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman

In five multi-method studies this dissertation examined how context based
morality may explain increased incidence of combat related psychological difficulties
among US service personnel. We were particularly interested in the relationship between
causing harm to others and moral self-perceptions and related emotional consequences. In
studies 1 and 2 we found that our samples of Iraq and Afghan war veterans reported that
a soldier would feel increased levels of guilt and shame and negative moral judgments of
the self when they return home and reflect on incidents of harm that may have occurred
during their deployments. These two studies were supported by three short experiments
showing that different moral judgments of harm were made depending on whether the
harm doing was interpersonal or intergroup. Interpersonal harm doing was judged more
harshly than intergroup harm leading us to believe that while in combat harm doing had
minimal consequences on the self-perceptions and emotions of a soldier and that when
they returned home to civilian life where interpersonal moral standards are more
prevalent their self-perceptions and emotional wellbeing was affected by their prior
conduct.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Media reports of U.S. military personnel returning home from Iraq and
Afghanistan expose the dire need for more information to better understand their mental
health needs. In early 2010 the Department of Veteran Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki
announced that 20% of all suicides in the U.S. (approximately 30,000 suicides annually)
were committed by soldiers returning from war. In a National Public Radio interview
(AFP, 2011) he suggested that these numbers could be attributed to the stress and “ the
trauma that goes with the current operations, where we have a much smaller military
being asked to do so much and then repeat it tour after tour.”
While suicide is the most extreme manifestation of the psychological suffering
endured as a result of combat experiences, psychological disorders such as posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety disorders are also considered to be
widespread and increasing among these veterans, especially those of a younger age.
However, the numbers that are reported may not provide a complete picture of the
psychological distress suffered by these soldiers. Commonly, there is a time lapse
between the traumatic experience and the presentation of symptoms, making it likely that
these numbers will increase further in the coming years. Though there is little controversy
about the numbers of suicides among veterans of the recent wars, there is some debate as
to what the real numbers are for those suffering from psychological difficulties related to
combat experiences. Thus studies have varied widely in their estimation of prevalence of
psychological difficulties such as PTSD. While findings of most studies have fallen
between 5 % and 10% of their respondents (Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting &
Koffman, 2004), these estimates fluctuate dramatically depending on the assessment tool,
1

the unit of the military that is assessed, the unique experiences of the units involved, and
when the soldiers were assessed. However, what is generally agreed upon is that a
substantial number of young men and women who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan
are suffering from psychological difficulties such as PTSD, and this has a direct negative
impact on their quality of life when they finally rejoin civil society.
Researchers, for many years, have been trying to understand why soldiers of these
wars are experiencing psychological difficulties at a seemingly higher rate than, for
example, World War II. Traditionally, the focus of such research has been directed at
experiences that feel threatening to the well-being of the soldiers and their sense of
vulnerability. Being injured, being shot at, witnessing the death of a buddy, and being in
close proximity to danger are regarded as correlates of psychological difficulties such as
PTSD, other anxiety disorders and depression. However, with the Vietnam War,
researchers also began to understand the importance of the uniqueness of modern
warfare. They have begun to focus on a factor that previously had been largely ignored
but seems to be key to understanding psychological difficulties among war veterans—
that is, having to engage in actions that cause harm to others, particularly noncombatants. Such experiences seem strongly related to the psychological distress
suffered by combat veterans. Litz, Stein, Delaney, Lebowitz, Nash, Silva & Maquen
(2009) in particular have broadened this focus and claim that committing any type of
harm-doing, witnessing harm-doing and not attempting to stop harm-doing are all related
to psychological distress. Broadly, the current research attempted to better understand
this relationship between the perpetration of harm on others and its psychological
implications via the concept of contextualized morality. For our purposes we do not limit
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ourselves to killing or atrocities, but like Litz et al. (2009) we define harm-doing more
broadly to include mistreatment of or injury to civilians.
1.1 Combat-Related Psychological Distress and Moral Injury
Vietnam marked the shift from conflict between states that had armies of
comparable size to “war amongst the people” (Smith, 2006, p. 5). In these cas of modern
warfare, the battlefield is not clearly defined; distinguishing between civilian and
combatant is impossible, and this leads to uncertainty with regard to appropriate
behavior towards civilians. For example 17% of respondent in one survey suggested that
non-combatants should be treated as insurgents (Mental Health Advisory Team [MHATIV] 2006). The vagueness of the battlefield increases the ambiguity of tense situations
that the soldiers face, as they can never be entirely sure of the motives of any person they
encounter; at the same time since every civilian is a potential enemy, the likelihood of
acting in ways that might harm them also increases Often incidents involving harm to
enemy-civilians are discussed in terms of their impact on the victims or their effect on
military strategy. Very rarely do scholars refer to the impact such behavior has on the
person perpetrating the harm. As Litz et al., (2009) point out, their consequences on the
psychological well-being of the soldiers also need to be seriously considered.
While most of these studies discussed a relationship between perpetration of harm
and PTSD, more recently researchers have suggested that the psychological difficulties
associated with such experiences, though similar to PTSD in their manifestation, are in
fact a distinct constellation of symptoms, that Litz et al. (2009) label “moral injury.”
These researchers define moral injury as resulting from “perpetrating, failing to prevent,
bearing witness or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and
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exceptions.” In a review, they propose that the resulting shame and to a lesser degree
guilt affects not only self-perceptions but also the manner in which they interact with the
world. They further propose that it is the attributions attached to how the self is seen in
relation to the event that creates these feelings of shame and guilt. If the attributions
about the transgressions are seen as enduring--as a disposition or a character flaw-- then
this experience is likely to lead to these negative emotions. Litz et al. (2009) discuss this
relationship in terms of cognitive dissonance. We were interested in providing a more
thorough understanding of this phenomenon, from the war zone to the return to civilian
life, and proposed that context based morality could help explain the relationship
between perpetration of harm and negative affect and self-perceptions.
Moral injury is a relatively new idea; virtually all the relevant research to date
has explored the relationship between the perpetration of harm and PTSD, not the broader
construct of moral injury. In the current research, rather than focus on a particular
psychological disorder, we examined how such experiences impact negative emotion and
self-perceptions in response to such events. In previous research these have been shown
to be correlates of psychological difficulties and disorders. Our decision to do this was a
response to ethical concerns related to asking veterans about psychological difficulties
they suffer when we were unable to provide them with relevant services and also the
realization that asking our respondents about their diagnoses might make them
uncomfortable, leading to non-participation and attrition of participants.
1.2 Veterans’ Harm-Doing and PTSD: Past Research
The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS, 1990) reports a
30.9% lifetime and 15% current prevalence of PTSD among Vietnam veterans (MacNair,
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2002). A diagnosis of PTSD requires the presence of antecedent traumatic events, defined
at the time of the NVVRS as events that are markedly distressing and outside the range of
usual human experience—especially events that threaten the life or physical integrity of
the individual or someone close to him or her; the definition also includes witnessing
death or serious injury to others (APA, 2000). PTSD symptoms include re-experiencing
trauma via intrusive thoughts, dreams or memories; numbing of responsiveness
demonstrated by constricted affect, feelings of detachment of others, or diminished
interest in important activities; and the presence of at least two other symptoms such as
sleep disturbance, exaggerated startled response, guilt, memory impairment, trouble
concentrating, and phobias about activities triggering recollection of the event (DSM IVTR).
The NVVR studies have found that those who said they engaged in killing were
more prone to experience these symptoms, more than those who had not killed. Also,
such diagnosis of PTSD was higher for those who had directly engaged in atrocities than
for those who had only witnessed the events (Strayer & Ellenhorn, 1975; Breslau &
Davis, 1987; Green, 1990; Hendin & Hass, 1984; Grossman, 1995). Beckham, Feldman
& Kirby (1998), in a study of Vietnam veterans, measured guilt, stress and involvement
in atrocities among them. In this study almost all the Vietnam veteran participants
reported having taken part in atrocities (93%); 82% reported direct involvement in the
violence, 33% reported endorsing participation in mutilation, and 54% observed
mutilation. Veterans related engaging in an average of 29 acts of atrocities. The
researchers found that both combat exposure and atrocity exposure were related to PTSD
severity. Interestingly, however, when controlling for combat exposure, atrocity exposure
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still predicted PTSD, global guilt, cognitions of guilt, hindsight bias and responsibility of
wrongdoing (Beckham et al., 1998).
Southwick, Gilmartin, Mcdonough, Morrissey (2006) also compared how
engaging in atrocities in combat situations differed from killing in traditional combat, in
terms of outcomes for PTSD. They found that PTSD was more severe for perpetrators
than for non-perpetrators and that killing increased the likelihood of someone suffering
from PTSD. Engaging in atrocities increased PTSD risk. In many ways the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq are very similar to Vietnam War, in that they have been fought
among the civilian population, with no clear combat opponents, and they have been
relatively unpopular here at home. Therefore, it is not surprising that veterans of the Iraq
and Afghan wars would also manifest similar patterns in both their war and psychological
experiences.
While most of the previous research has focused on establishing the relationship
between perpetration of harm and the experience of psychological difficulties, we were
interested in investigating the psychological processes behind this phenomenon. We
argue that engaging in harm-doing directly affects the moral judgments that a person
makes of himself or herself and the emotional reaction such a person has towards his/her
behavior. While negative self- perceptions are in themselves damning, we also believe
that others may also see the person as immoral, which adds an additional layer of
difficulty to the experience.
1.3 Morality, Social Inclusion, and Self-Esteem
A review of the literature on morality and moral judgments points to the fact that
morality is one of the key bases, if not the most important basis, by which an individual is
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judged by others. Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics recognized the centrality of morality
in judging others, for he emphasized the importance of righteous indignation, being just,
sincerity, wisdom and friendliness (as cited by Robinson, 1986). In fact he postulated
that competence and friendliness are only important if they are expressed through moral
avenues. In more contemporary work, Schwartz (1992) found that morality was
universally named as the most important factor in judging a person as a worthy group
member. Although some researchers have argued that self-perceptions of morality are
used to bolster self-esteem when someone has lost face in other realms (Blanz,
Mummendey & Otten, 1995 & Ellemers & van Rijswijk, 1997), considerable research
has found that people rate being moral as more important than other characteristics such
as competence and intellectual ability. For example Schwartz & Bardi (2001) found that
American students said that it was more important to be honest than to be competent.
Many of these studies focused on judgments made at the individual level, either
about oneself or about another, but similar findings have been reported at the group level
as well. Recent work on group perceptions that looked at competence, sociability and
morality (using orthogonal measures) found that morality was the most important factor
in judging the group as worthy (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). Even when
participants did not ascribe the most morality to their ingroup, they nevertheless viewed
morality as the primary factor when evaluating their ingroup.
Given that morality is the basis for social inclusion and exclusion, engaging in a
moral transgression could have severe negative consequences for an individual. Although
going against any single moral rule would constitute a moral transgression, it seems that
not all moral transgressions are equal. Interestingly, transgressions involving moral
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proscriptions, including particularly harm-doing, seem to have a stronger impact on how
the individual is treated within the group (Janoff-Bulman, Shiekh & Hepp, 2010). Yet
even in the absence of obvious harm, transgressions often result in immediate
condemnation of the behavior and the person. Findings from Haidt’s (2001)
“dumbfounding experiments,” for example, show that perceived moral transgressions
(even without harm) elicit spontaneous condemnatory responses driven by negative
emotions. Also, Pizarro, Laney, Morris & Loftus (2006) found that if study participants
received negative information about an individual’s morality, when tested a week later
they remembered the target person as having committed a more serious transgression
than the person had really committed (Study 1); this suggests that negative responses to
moral transgressions may have a long-term negative effect on how an individual is
perceived.
Other research has found that perceived moral transgressions not only result in
condemnation, but also in isolation of the offender. This is evident in studies that have
explored the “moral mandate effect.” The moral mandate, or the strong connection
between an attitude and a moral belief (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), is an important factor in
how individuals create interpersonal relationships. Anyone who holds an opposing moral
mandate is seen as going against moral rules that govern the group. Therefore, when
people learn that another individual has beliefs that violate their moral mandates, they
show strong intolerance of the other. They also establish greater social distance from the
other.
Being isolated and alienated is a difficult prospect with real negative
psychological consequences, for it thwarts one of the most basic needs of the being
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human; the need to belong (Adler, 1930; Maslow, 1943 & 1954; Bowlby, 1969 & 1970;
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 2004). Adler (1930) identified the two basic needs
that drive human behavior: the need for superiority and the need to belong, or “social
feeling.” He describes social feeling as people’s tendency to “unite themselves with other
human beings, to accomplish their tasks in cooperation with others.” (p. 115). Although
initially Adler viewed these two motivations as distinct and equal, in later writing he
identified the motivation to belong as the more fundamental. He argued that “...feeling
worth…stems from a close bond with community of man” (pg. x–ix). In later years,
Adler (1937) also expanded the concept of social feeling to encompass the human
striving to contribute to the group and to be seen as a valuable member of the group, and
he located the motivation for superiority in this desire to contribute to the group (also see
Ferguson, 1989, for a discussion).
More recently Fiske (2004) argued in the same manner that the need for
belongingness is one of the primary human motivations and would produce negative
consequences if not fulfilled. Baumeister and Leary (1995) also propose that the need for
belongingness is of the utmost importance to the individual; rejection may make a person
feel bad and depressed and may negatively affect psychological well-being over the long
term (Baumeister, 1991). It is not surprising that the social exclusion as a consequence of
moral transgressions can lead to negative outcomes. As Cooley (1972) noted in
describing the “looking glass self,”, each person “live(s) in the minds of others without
knowing it.” Humans continually monitor themselves from the point of view of others
and how one perceives oneself, through the eyes of others, could result in extremely
intense emotion, including pride and shame (Scheff, 2005). Thus being excluded and
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shunned from the group because of a moral transgression can lead to the disruption of
normal functioning.
This is supported by studies that have found that even the threat of social rejection
leads to lowered self-esteem (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). Other effects of social
rejection include high levels of anxiety, high levels of risk-taking in children, lower
levels of empathy, emotional insensitivity, lowered self-regulation and intelligent
thought, and increased aggressive and self-defeating behavior (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice
& Twenge, 2007; DeWall & Baumiester, 2006; Nesdale & Lambert, 2008; Twenge &
Baumeister, 2005; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007).
Individuals are highly motivated to be accepted by--to belong to-- their group and to
avoid being rejected and excluded.
1.4 War, PTSD, and Social Exclusion
These negative person perceptions and social exclusion were evident in the case
of the Vietnam War, where society at large judged returning Vietnam veterans rather
harshly. The sense that no one else is able to understand the conditions under which the
atrocities took place and the fear of being judged and being blamed frequently prevents
veterans from engaging in conversations about their experiences. This encourages
veterans to isolate themselves, which is a primary characteristic for those who suffer from
PTSD and is also often associated in these patients with higher risk for self-harm such as
suicide.
Further public disapproval alsot eliminates one of the essential conditions for
overcoming PTSD. A large body of literature has found that social support is associated
with better outcomes for PTSD sufferers. Both support before and after a traumatic event
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can considerably decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of PTSD. Human social
experience is central to the manner in which people respond to traumas. Social
experience can come in the form of a relationship with a parent, a friend, a partner, a
community or a group. It is this social experience that buffers against mental distress
resulting from chronic disease. In two meta-analytic studies, this was found to be the case
for PTSD as well (Brewin, Andrews & Valentine 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey & Weiss,
2000).
A 14-year follow–up study of PTSD among Vietnam veterans found that social
support was a protective factor and the lack of social support was an aggravating factor
(Koenen, Stellman, Stellman & Sommers, 2003; Summerfield & Hume, 1993). This
study found that veterans with more community involvement were more likely to have
their PTSD go into remission. On the other hand, those who felt negative community
attitudes upon returning home were likely to continue to have chronic PTSD. These two
variables point to a connection to the quality of community networks. Reintegration into
the community means creating social bonds, but it can also mean negative attitudes that
signal isolation, ostracism and lack of social connection. Similar findings have been
reported with rape victims. Isolation and a perception of being blamed increases the
likelihood of prolonged PTSD among rape victims (Filipas & Ullman, 2001; Ullman
1996; Ullman & Filipas, 2001). Zoellner, Foa and Brigidi (1999) report that when
controlling for initial severity of symptoms, social friction increased the likelihood of the
maintenance of PTSD.
Some traumatic events are more likely to elicit negative responses. Those that are
actually seen and experienced by a majority of the community elicit relatively positive
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community responses, whereas events that are unseen, unshared, and ambiguous will
result in more negative attitudes (Andrews & Brewin, 1990). The latter fits the situation
of Vietnam and Iraq, where the average American may not understand the circumstances
of combat.
While negative judgments and social exclusion may be difficult for these soldiers
to contend with, the more potent and innocuous threat maybe that these responses by
others also color the self-perceptions soldiers have of themselves. Not only does the lack
of social support create isolation and emotional disengagement, but it can also create
additional self-blame. The looking glass self is a powerful factor in how individuals judge
themselves (Cooley, 1902). The knowledge that society at large may judge you to be an
immoral person can only increase feelings of self-blame and moral failure. This may be
harder to contend with as it becomes an ever-present condemnation of the self that the
person is unable to ignore.
Generally seeing the self as immoral also has emotional ramifications for the
person. As Beckham et al., (1998) found, one of the key reactions to the recognition that
one has engaged in combat-related atrocities is the feeling of global guilt. Feeling guilty
is often followed by a need to engage in reparative behavior (Tangney, Wagner, HillBarlow, Marschall & Gramzow, 1996), but in these cases soldiers are often unable to go
back to make amends. This sort of chronic unresolved guilt has been identified as
maladaptive (see, e.g., Tangney, 1991), often leading to self- punishing behavior ( Exline,
Deshea & Holeman, 2007) and chronic ruminations (Silfver, 2007). Ruminations are a
common symptom of those suffering from PTSD and moral injury. Therefore, we could
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make the claim that unresolved guilt among soldiers is associated with their
psychological difficulties.
In addition, they are also likely to have intense feelings of shame. While guilt is
associated with a single event, shame is generally related to a more global negative
perception of the self (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1991). While a soldier may feel guilt about
a particular incident it is also possible that perpetrating harm may also have an effect on
the global perceptions of the self. The threatened self-view destroys one of the key
assumptions that govern our world view. We each hold fundamental assumptions that the
world is meaningful and benevolent, and we are good, moral people, and trauma involves
the shattering of one or more of these assumptions (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Research
looking at the relationship between self-perception and psychological difficulties has
focused on ideas about not being able to protect oneself and not being able to depend on
the self to act in a manner that allows the person to be safe. However, recognizing that
one has behaved in a manner that is inhumane, cruel and immoral will make the
individual question the fundamental assumption about the self as good and moral. When
fundamental assumptions are shattered they take with them the sense of stability and
security they had provided, to be replaced by intense anxiety and extreme psychological
distress (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Additionally, the fact that one cannot perceive the self as
moral anymore can produce self-encompassing shame. Therefore, in our research we
hoped to find these negative emotions, guilt and shame, associated with believing that a
person had behaved in a manner that was deemed to be immoral; we expected that such
behavior would also result in negative self-perceptions and self-evaluations.
1.5 Context Based Morality: Interpersonal vs. Intergroup Standards
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The socialization of a young child universally includes lessons about moral rules
that he or she needs to follow to be a valued member of society. Though manifest in
different ways, the rules include two basic principles: the proscription, do not harm others
and the prescription, help others (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh & Hepp, 2009). More
specifically, the rules discourage lying, cheating, causing physical injury to other
members of your social group while at the same time encouraging giving to charity,
volunteering and in general helping fellow society members when they need help.
Learning these rules is important because not following these rules can result in social
exclusion– an action that is considered necessary to maintain social cohesion. These are
standards that govern our day to day dealings; the default moral rules that keep us on the
straight and narrow. For our research we label them interpersonal morals.
However, there are some special circumstances in which these default
interpersonal moral standards are overridden by a new set of moral standards. Typically,
they are situations in which groups and group membership are salient. There is clear
evidence that group interactions do not seem to adhere to the interpersonal moral
standards. As Tajfel and Turner (1986) point out, the individual behaves differently when
group identity is salient than when personal identity is salient. Research in this realm has
shown that in groups, individuals are much more competitive than in individual
interactions, and that group members are generally lenient against group members who
aggress towards members of other groups (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). While support
from the collective for intergroup violence is important, there is also clear evidence that
groups in general are more hostile and competitive than individuals. Therefore
individuals in an intergroup situation are more likely to be violent. These conclusions are

14

based on studies based on interindividual–intergroup discontinuity research (Hoyle,
Pinkley & Insko, 1989; Schopler, Insko, Drigotas & Graetz, 1993; Schopler, Insko,
Wieselquist, Pemberton, Witcher & Kozar, 2001). In addition it is also clear that the
interaction becomes more competitive due to the fear, distrust and greed a group of
individuals feel when they are confronted with another group that is in competition with
them (Schopler et al., 1993).
This is further supported by Mummendey & Otten (1998), who presented
participants with videos that included aggressive actions that were either portrayed in an
inter-individual or intergroup context. In the intergroup conditions the participants were
either of the same group as the perpetrator or from a different group. Keeping with the
predictions overall, same group perpetrators’ behaviors were evaluated less negatively.
More interestingly, however, they found that participants perceived the same group
perpetrators’ behavior against an outgroup the least negative, and behavior against a
member of the ingroup as most negative. In a different study subjects perceived the
perpetrator as behaving in a manner that was in keeping with the group norm when
aggressing against a member of an outgroup, while an individual who engaged in
aggression towards an ingroup member was perceived to be harmful to the group.
The norms of the group can be transmitted from the group to the individual in the
form of social roles that the individual assumes. Zimbardo’s (l973) Stanford prison
experiment was the classic reproduction of the justification of behavior as role-based. In a
retrospective analysis of the study, Zimbardo (2007) explains the effect being randomly
assigned to either a prisoner or a guard had on the average college student--often turning
the student into a physically and emotionally broken prisoner or a brutal, sadistic guard.
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Zimbardo himself admits to having been carried away by the role of the prison warden,
ignoring the cruel treatment of the prisoners by the guards.
Zimbardo explains the transformation of the guards in terms of the roles that they
were playing (Zimbardo, Maslach & Haney, 1999). Among the lessons Zimbardo
professes to have learned from this particular study is that part of the power of the
situation lies in social roles that provide permission to behave in ways that would
otherwise be impossible. Thus in the case of the prison guards the cruel behavior could be
justified in terms of permitted behavior for that particular role. He further points out that
under conditions where there is no real threat or external compunction to behave in this
cruel manner, cognitive dissonance (see Festinger, 1957) enabled individuals to ignore
personality traits and general inhibitions against cruelty; the less the compunction and
external justification, the more dissonance, resulting in more uncharacteristic behavior
(Zimbardo et al., 1999). Importantly, playing a particular role in this case also meant that
the participants were thinking of the other prison guards within the closed confines of the
simulated prison as their primary group. As recalled by Zimbardo (2007), the beginning
of the most cruel treatment of the prisoners began when the prisoners decided to rebel
against the guards. The prisoners were seen as a threat to the group and therefore had to
be dealt with appropriately. Therefore part of the role that the prison guards were playing
became the protection of the group and prison “society.” The relaxation of the constraints
against cruel behavior provided by the role, coupled with the belief that one was
behaving for the good of the group, provided the perfect mix for the character
transformation that was witnessed.

16

The Abu Ghraib scandal provided a real life replication of what went on in the
Stanford prison (Zimbardo, 2007). Reports emerged of the inhumane torture of prisoners
at the prison and were supported by photographs. The official interpretation and
explanation for the incident was that it was the work of a few bad apples. However, as
Zimbardo points out, a pervasive understanding that this behavior was acceptable in this
particular situation, where the prisoners were “enemies” and there was a lack of
guidelines as to how these prison guards should act, made the torture virtually inevitable.
The prison guards could act in inhumane, cruel ways while justifying the behavior as part
of the role of a guard in an Iraqi prison, with minimal damage to their self-perception.
As exemplified in part by the prison experiment, the relationship between salience
of the group and hostile, violent behavior seems to be made stronger by external threats
to the group. Lahti & Weinstein (2005) point out that commitment to the group is
inversely related to group stability: when the group is threatened, members of the group
are more committed to the group. Similarly, in a cross-cultural study based on archival
data for several different preindustrial societies, Cohen, Montoya and Insko (2006) found
that loyalty to the group increased favorable attitudes towards outgroup violence and also
increased the likelihood of war. Cohen et al. (2006) argue that this is because the moral
standards that govern human behavior change when the focus shifts from the individual
level to the intergroup level.
Individual level interpersonal morality emphasizes altruism, concern for others
and avoidance of harm against others, the essential moral rules discussed earlier. In a
sense, moral codes postulate that this is the manner in which every other human being
should be treated. In other words, the ingroup in this case could be considered all of
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humankind, with no outgroup to compare against. In instances when ingroup—outgroup
differences become salient, intergroup rather than interpersonal morality becomes
dominant. Thus, threat to the ingroup not only makes the group more cohesive, but also
changes the moral norms that the group members are expected to follow. Cohen et al.
(2006) argue that the intergroup morality that functions in such a situation is
characterized by competition and any other action that favors the group, no matter how
unfavorable the consequences of these actions to the outgroup. There is no single
superordinate group or collection of individuals, as in the case of interpersonal morality.
Rather, there is an ingroup and an outgroup that can be identified as outside the boundary
of one’s own group.
Pinter, Insko, Wildschut, Kirchner, Montoya & Wolf (2007) assigned participants
either to an individual interaction or a group interaction. For the individual interaction
condition, two participants were seated individually in two separate rooms, while for the
group interactions two groups of three participants were seated in the two rooms. In the
group condition, one participant in each group was assigned the role of the leader and this
person was in charge of the interaction. The other members of the group would, however,
consult with the leader about the interaction. In both conditions participants then engaged
in the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. In each of the trials, each individual or group leader
was either able to cooperate or compete with the other. If both parties in the interaction
cooperated, they would benefit equally; if one party were to compete and the other were
to cooperate, the party competing would benefit more, and finally if both parties
competed, both parties would again benefit equally, but less than if they both
cooperated. Pinter et al. (2007) found that in the group condition leaders were
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significantly more likely to be competitive than those assigned to the individual
interaction. These findings have been replicated in several other studies, mostly using
variations of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.
Though this phenomenon is often described as being suggestive of group
morality, the researchers do not explain exactly why these differences in behavior occur.
We propose that when participants interact in groups, the default interpersonal moral
standards are overridden by group moral rules.. We explain this difference in behavior as
a shift from interpersonal moral standards to group moral standards-- a shift from
avoiding harm and helping that facilitate group living to a focus on protecting the group.
Graham, Haidt & Motyl (2010), have shown some evidence of the focus of moral
concern shifting to group loyalty, authority and sanctity when religious group becomes
salient, suggesting the possible operation of group moral standards. While these findings
are encouraging there is still no clear evidence of our prediction that behaviors seen as
proscriptive in interpersonal contexts become more similar to prescriptions or allowances
in intergroup contexts.
Intergroup moral standards would mostly occur in a situation where two groups
are in a zero–sum competition making threat to the group salient; this is qualified by
certain other conditions. We propose that these group moral standards do not apply to all
groups equally; rather these group moral standards apply most strongly to one’s own
ingroup. However, group moral standards will be the basis for judgments about harmful
behaviors when the competition is between any two groups. This provided us with the
research framework to understand the psychological difficulties of veterans returning
home. Combat situations, being intense, zero-sum intergroup interactions, elicit
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intergroup moral standards of complete loyalty to the group even if it means causing
harm to another. This harm-doing may not be seen as highly immoral; it may be seen as
not so immoral, but rather justified and understandable. These moral standards act as a
protective factor that prevents soldiers while deployed from experiencing the negative
self-perceptions and negative emotions that are related to the harm-doing. However, on
their return to civilian life, removed from the intergroup context they revert to (default)
interpersonal moral standards. They also become starkly aware that they are being judged
by others based on these interpersonal standards and revert also to judging themselves
using these standards. The harm-doing that could be justified previously can no longer be
seen as justified. This results in the person seeing him or herself as immoral and also in
feelings of guilt and shame that lead to psychological difficulties.
1.6 Current Studies
The first set of studies in this dissertation examined the relationship between
harm-doing by soldiers and immoral self-perceptions and negative emotions about the
self. In Study 1, we used a focus group and several interviews to investigate soldiers’
experiences involving incidents of perpetration of harm. In addition the study also served
as an opportunity to validate our theoretical perspective with our participants. Study 2, a
survey with a larger sample of veterans, enabled us to further generalize and quantify our
findings from Study 1. We were interested in general information about the deployment,
soldier experiences with civilians during their deployment, incidents of harm, how these
events of harm were construed during the deployments, if and how the construal changed
when they returned to the U,S,, and most importantly how they responded in terms of
affect and self-perceptions. We hypothesized that interpersonal interactions and
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intergroup interactions would elicit different moral standards, and moral judgments of
perpetrations of harm would differ depending on which of these standard are being used.
More specifically, a shift in moral standards (from interpersonal to intergroup morality)
with changes in the context (deployment to civilian life), were expected to lead to
increased negative affect and self-perceptions and to harsher moral judgments.
In the second set of studies we focused more generally on the differential use of
interpersonal or intergroup moral standards in judging harm-doing. Studies 3, 4 & 5 were
experiments where our overarching hypothesis was that in contexts where intergroup
moral standards are salient perpetration of harm would lead to less negative affect and
less harsh moral judgments than the same transgression in a context where interpersonal
moral standards are salient. Studies 3 and 4 used combat-related event descriptions to
manipulate salience of intergroup and interpersonal moral standards. Intergroup conflict
and war are perhaps the clearest examples of situations where intergroup moral standards
arise.
However, we also wanted to explore whether these hypotheses would apply to more
mundane examples of group behavior. Therefore, in Study 5 we focused on a case of
academic cheating and attempted to manipulate the moral standard used to judge the
behavior .
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
As discussed earlier, the first two studies were an attempt to explore veterans’
experiences with perpetration of harm and their responses to such instances. Having
returned home after serving in the different theatres of war, these soldiers were in the
unique position of having experienced a dramatic shift from intergroup moral standards
in the combat theatre to interpersonal moral standards once they returned home. It
therefore seemed that the consequences of this shift in moral standards would be apparent
and could be readily explored with this group.
Study 1 went through two iterations. The first attempt at conducting the study was
in the form of a focus group. The main purpose of the group was to receive feedback on
our model about the shift between intergroup and interpersonal moral standards and how
it might affect psychological well-being. We set out to conduct a focus group of 8-10
people. The recruitment email stating that the study would be a discussion of their
combat experiences was sent through the Veterans’ Services office at UMass, Amherst.
However, due to a poor response rate we decided to conduct the focus group with the five
participants who responded to our email. These participants had all agreed to meet at the
appointed time for the focus group, yet in the end only two of them showed up. We
proceeded anyway.
The discussion began with the researchers explaining the purpose of our meeting-to get feedback on our theoretical explanation of the psychological distress suffered by
veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (see Appendix 1 for the complete transcript of
opening discussion). While we had said that we would audiotape the focus group, to
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make the interaction as non- threatening as possible we decided that we would not to do
so. We explained that our theory proposed that veterans of war were shifting between
moral standards, specifically intergroup moral standards in the battlefront and
interpersonal moral standards when they return home to the U.S.; and we believed that
the shift in moral standards may have real consequences for the psychological well-being
of the veterans via their self-perception of morality. We understood that in the context of
combat causing harm was often acceptable and even required. A good soldier was
defined as someone who fought for his country and made sure that his “buddies” were all
safe. These were the tenets of intergroup moral standards; the group’s well-being was of
the greatest priority. From this perspective, any action that caused harm, especially to
someone who was identified as being a threat to one’s group, would likely not have a
negative impact on the way that the soldier would perceive the morality of him or herself.
However, upon returning home, the context change may elicit interpersonal moral
standards. The change would likely have significant negative consequences for the selfperceptions of these soldiers. The two veterans served as a sounding board, for we
explained our perspective and they gave us their opinions based on their own battlefield
experiences. Both veterans who were present that day had been deployed in Iraq, and one
of them was preparing to leave for a deployment to Afghanistan. Their experiences there
included active combat, and they both had much contact with civilians.
Once we explained our theoretical framework, we began by asking about the
deployments that our participants had already completed. From the beginning of the
discussion, it was clear that there was a difference in the way that soldiers experienced a
deployment depending on several factors. Primarily, these experiences could vary
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depending who the soldier dealt with in his or her chain of command and where the
soldier was stationed during his or her deployment. Despite these differences one aspect
of their experience was shared by both participants. They talked about the hard balance
they had to strike between their involvement in development work in Iraq and the everpresent security concerns. The soldiers explained that having to work on nation building
brought them in close contact with civilians. At the same time dealing with the everpresent security issues made for a very awkward relationship with civilians. For example,
they spoke about situations where soldiers had to patrol the streets or photograph
buildings for intelligence and reconnaissance missions. Often they would attract groups
of people who gathered to watch. While the soldiers wanted to be friendly towards these
people, they were also acutely aware of instances where suicide bombers could lurk in
the crowd and attack them. They also observed that the same sort of uneasiness was
possibly felt by the civilians.
These interactions also opened the door to possible exchanges that could result in
harm to civilians. According to our participants, training, leadership and the manner in
which the U.S. presence in Iraq was understood by the soldiers played important roles in
whether such events take place and how they are perceived. During the discussion it was
acknowledged that there were situations where poor leadership led to violence against
civilians. Our participants were of the opinion that there were some battalions that had
leadership with a poor understanding of the mission and therefore created a “kill, kill,
kill” mentality among the soldiers. However, they also agreed that these were the
exceptions.
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They suggested that the more likely scenario was that the soldiers followed all the
procedures that were necessary to minimize civilian casualties. The soldiers would warn
civilians in the area, well ahead of time and several times thereafter, until an operation
began. This way the soldiers could make sure that they were providing civilians with
every opportunity to leave the area and avoid being harmed. However, one of the
participants argued that even though this was done, there were still many situations where
civilians were mistreated or harmed. For example, U.S. soldiers needed to carry out
search operations regularly and it was impossible to warn people of them. These
situations often involved the use of unreasonable force and had the potential to quickly
lead to situations of mistreatment of civilians. While the discussion on this topic
remained at a very general level, we attempted to get more details of specific incidents of
harm that these soldiers themselves may have known about. We also wanted to know
what feelings and emotions were tied to such events and incidents. However, it became
very clear that our participants were uncomfortable talking about specific incidents of
harm. The discussion remained focused on the ambiguity of situations experienced by the
soldiers and the ever-present dangers from roadside bombings and suicide bombings. As
we continued to prod them on the question of incidents involving harm to civilians, one
of our participants began talking about experiencing the stress of constantly feeling
vulnerable.
He claimed that all the training can only shield a soldier from the stresses of
combat to a certain degree. He used the analogy of a sponge. While training helps
soldiers deal with many of their experiences on the battlefield, each soldier has a
saturation point beyond which he/she is unable to deal with any more. This is especially
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so for soldiers who have served in Iraq, as they were continuously and constantly
required to go out on missions. The constant exposure to high stress combat situations
does not allow soldiers to have any recovery time or a break from the stress. Therefore,
they reach this saturation point very quickly, after which it is likely that the stress of the
next situation would make them overreact.
It must be noted here that by the time this phase of the discussion began we were
at the end of the 90 minutes that had been allocated. Our participant mentioned that there
were several such situations that he does not allow himself to think about. After a little
encouragement he began to slowly give a brief description of an incident that had taken
place during the deployment. He said he had accompanied a captain to a meeting with
two sheiks; the captain had left all his armor and weapons outside the meeting place in
order to establish trust with the two locals with whom he was meeting. During the
meeting the sheiks’ bodyguards who were armed got into an argument. Fearing that there
was a possibility that they would draw their guns and start shooting at each other, the
soldier used his weapon to attack the two bodyguards with physical blows rather than
firing at them, which resulted in one of them being seriously injured. Retrospectively, he
believes that the likelihood of a shooting incident was minimal. While he did not have to
suffer any military consequences for his behavior, he seemed genuinely distressed that he
had used unreasonable force. He said that when he thought about this incident he would
always think about alternative actions he could have taken.
However, the fact that it took 1½ hours to get to this story made it clear that
veterans would be uncomfortable talking about such incidents in a group, which in turn
provided us with some explanation for the poor response to our focus group request.
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Therefore, we decided to explore the same questions using an individual structured
interview format. I conducted interviews with five veterans (three of which were
audiotaped)who volunteered and who, like the participants in the “focus group,” were
paid $15.00 for their participation. They were all either undergraduate or graduate
students at UMass, Amherst.
The aim of these interviews was again to get feedback on the theoretical model
we were proposing and to gather evidence supportive (or not) of our theory in the stories
of their deployments. Of the five participants one had served in Kuwait and four others
had served in Iraq. Their deployments ranged from a single deployment lasting seven
months to two deployments that together added up to almost 22 months. They were
engaged in various tasks during their deployments. Three of them had been involved in
manning check points, road patrols, driving in convoys and search operations; one said he
was involved in development work, working to improve educational facilities, and
another said he worked on transportation of goods and fuel and was also in charge of
vehicle maintenance.
One of the soldiers acknowledged that he had been diagnosed with PTSD. He had
served in Kuwait and had been involved in transportation and vehicle maintenance. He
attributed his PTSD diagnosis to a kind of survival guilt that he had felt while he was in
Kuwait and since returning to the US. He reiterated several times throughout our
interview that he regretted not being able to get involved in battle and not having had to
fire a single shot during his deployment. However, as the discussion progressed it also
became clear that the manner in which he had experienced combat differed greatly from
that of those who had served in the more active battle theatres of Iraq. Much of his views
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were formed based on information he seemed to have gathered from others who had
served in these areas. It may have been colored by an admiration for these soldiers who
had seen “real combat.” For example, he suggested that interactions between American
soldiers and Iraqi civilians had always been friendly and that these civilians were glad
that the Americans were there: “The Iraqis hadn’t seen mobile phones till we landed
there…they were glad to see us,” he said. These sentiments were reiterated by him
throughout our conversation. However, the other veterans painted a very different picture
of the interaction between civilians and American troops, one that echoed the view
expressed by the two veterans in the “focus group.” One soldier said: “I wasn’t sure how
to react to them,” referring to Iraqi civilians. “The kids would follow us around wherever
we went. We would wave and they would wave back and shout and laugh. The adults
always stood back, they were suspicious. They didn’t smile a lot. We were suspicious,
too.” Another soldier suggested that it was probably hard for Iraqis to have a favorable
view of the Americans. “We were holding a gun in one hand and waving with the other.
We must have looked weird. What were they supposed to believe about us?” He also
believed that many Iraqis were justifiably fearful of American troops and that this may
have led to the uneasiness around the troops. “We were banging on their doors in the
middle of the night. There was no way they could see us as a friendly force,” he said.
However, when asked about incidents of harm to Iraqi civilians, I saw the same
reluctance that had been displayed by our “focus group” participants. In talking about
such incidents none of the veterans said that they had personally known of a situation
where a civilian had been killed. However, all of them acknowledged that it was quite
likely that civilians were harmed and mistreated. “My best friend was deployed at the
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same time…He’s told me things he had to do when transporting prisoners that would give
most people nightmares. But he is the kindest, gentlest person. He has a five year old
daughter and he is great dad.” This type of comment directly addressed the contextual
basis of different moralities, and when asked about this all our interviewees agreed that
our model was right in the way it conceptualized the different moral standards. One of
our participants said:
“I think you are on the right track that there are definitely two sets of
mentalities where soldiers have to create that compartmentalization,
because honestly you don’t realize what happened over there until you
return… When you are over there it’s about the mission. You don’t really
think about what you do and what happens while you are there because
you are in that group setting and you are following standard operating
procedure: what you learned, what you were taught. You are in that soldier
mode. When you return home and you are in a civilian setting you are not
amongst your soldiers and your leadership and not vigilant everyday. You
have the time to think about what went on and what you did and
somebody is going to start thinking…well maybe I should have done this,
maybe I should have done this and not that.”
While addressing the shift in moral standards this comment also directly
addressed the idea that often veterans would experience guilt for events that had taken
place in battle, and that this guilt was most acute once they had returned home. Another
soldier added in the same vein, “You don’t have the luxury of sitting back and
contemplating (in the battlefront). I don’t think, in my opinion, the PTSD manifests till
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soldiers come home and reintegrate into the civilian world with civilian morals and begin
to think maybe I shouldn’t have shot at that person or maybe I should have waited or
given them another warning. At the time you have the fight or flight mentality. You want
to fight, you want to protect your ground and your soldiers.”
It is fairly evident that while in the battlefield soldiers were not fully processing events
that were taking place, but experienced regret, remorse and guilt for their actions once
they returned home.
However, as in the “focus group,” they all agreed that incidents of harm to
civilians were the exception. One of them said, “I don’t think there are many soldiers
who would see somebody and just start shooting at them, because again you don’t want
to be that guy who kills innocent civilians.” Another spoke of how he would handle a
situation that seemed dangerous but was ambiguous: “When you are confronted with
such a situation you are trying to remember everything that you do. My gut reaction
would be to bring it up to the rest of the crew. Hey, the person at three o’clock. Is he
holding a cell phone in his hands? Because I am seeing something. A guy in the middle
of the desert who is watching our convoy and is not herding sheep or anything--kind of
sticks out to me.”
While it was clear that this type of event would result in considerable remorse
among soldiers, just the idea that what they did was in some way immoral makes it hard
for these returning veterans to share their stories. Our participants talked about veterans
being uncomfortable sharing their experiences with anyone. Though they often felt a
sense of camaraderie when they met other veterans, even in these settings sharing events
that involved causing harm was very difficult. The veterans would in a manner filter what
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information about their deployments they would share: “I guess they are sharing what
they are comfortable sharing. They are not going to talk about the time they ran out in the
middle of the night to their vehicle and cried …for 30 minutes because of the pressure
that their chain of command was putting on them. They are not going to tell you that
story. They are going to tell you about the goat they ran over because it was too close to
the road. Or you know the near miss, the truck in front of them got blown up but they
didn’t. They will only share what they have come to terms with and what they’ve deemed
in their own minds as being okay.”
The feeling that they cannot share their experiences is also compounded by the
sense that civilians may not understand what they have experienced. “If Joe civilian
came up and had that same experience, he would freak out. He would judge it with a
different set of moral judgments. For a soldier it is all in a day’s work,” one veteran
explained. They also spoke about the feeling that people were ill informed and were not
interested in understanding the real nature of the war. “I will be in a class and the Middle
East will come up. Invariably, someone will talk about how our troops are over their
fighting a war for oil. I am tired of arguing with these kids. They don’t understand.” This
sort of remark was regarded as derogatory and often made them feel alienated from their
surroundings. While they believed that they were being treated better than veterans of the
Vietnam War, they still believed that there was a sense of apathy about missions abroad,
and this in turn made them feel misunderstood and distanced from society.
One of our participants alleged that this was more than just ignorance on the part
of civilians. He claimed that the authorities and the systems in place did not recognize
guilt as being an emotion that was associated with their battle experience. He complained
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that it hasn’t been recognized in the psychological literature, except for survivor guilt.
Guilt associated with harming another is not taken into consideration in diagnoses. He
further pointed out that this disregard of guilt was a deliberate political ploy. “If you
admit guilt over something that means you have been wrong. And politically this is not
acceptable. Therefore, our soldiers are not allowed to feel guilt.” He went on to say that
this indeed was a huge disservice to soldiers. He also saw broader implications for a
society that practices this disregard of guilt. “As a society you become complicit in the
crimes that your government commits. You become desensitized to it because as a
society you are not being held accountable.”
2.1 Discussion
Both the two-person “focus group” and the interviews together provided some
invaluable information about how our model might be manifested in the real world. Our
interviewees and focus group participants immediately responded positively and
affirmatively to our proposals. In the focus group as well as the interviews participants
talked about the different moral standards that exist in the in the battlefront and in civil
society back home in the U.S. They talked about the battlefield instilling norms about
making sure that you were holding your ground and protecting your soldiers, while in
civilian life you are expected to be kind and gentle. In addition to the concerns of keeping
the soldiers safe, the battlefield also did not provide much respite for actually thinking
about the events that were taking place. Therefore, coming back affects these soldiers in
several ways. First they begin to rethink their behavior, because they begin using a
different set of moral standards and also because they may have the time to think about
their experiences in the battlefield. Secondly, their surroundings also affect their
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perceptions of the events. Many of our participants talked about how they felt that back in
the U.S. they were unable to discuss their experiences in the battlefield because of fears
that they might be misunderstood by civilians who are not privy to the situation of the
battlefield and its demands. And this inability to share makes them feel alienated and
distanced from civil society. This is significant because these types of feelings can only
exacerbate negative effects of their combat experiences.
However, it is noted here that I spoke with only a minute sample of veterans, and
it is possible that what was discussed was unique to their experiences. Therefore, in the
next study, using the information that we gathered in the “focus group” and the
interviews, we created a survey to collect information from a broader sample of veterans.
We were able to collect information from a larger sample, and we assumed that the
anonymity would allow us to ask more detailed questions about the veterans’
experiences.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
This study further explored the findings of Study 1. It was an attempt to see if we
could apply what we had learned from our interviews to the broader veteran population
and to gather more quantifiable data on this topic. The survey was guided by the
information that we had gathered in the interviews. Not only was this survey based on
Study 1, we also had veterans who had taken part in the first study involved in
developing the survey instrument. It consisted of three separate sections that attempted to
capture details of the soldiers’ deployment, information about interactions with civilians,
including the perpetration of harm against civilians, and finally a section looking at
veterans’ responses to these experiences.
3.1 Method
Our first attempt to recruit participants for this survey was at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst Veterans’ Services office. However, as we once again had a
poor response to our recruitment email, we decided to collect data online through Mturk.
We were not surprised at the low response rate on campus, given our experiences with
the previous study. It was possible that because they would be asked about the
perpetration of harm, student veterans were afraid to participate as they possibly thought
the responses could be traced to the participant. Participants on Mturk were compensated
$0.25 (which is typical for Mturk studies). We specified that only veterans of the U.S.
armed forces currently in the U.S. were eligible to take part in the study. The survey was
created on survey monkey and was posted on MTurk.
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3.1.1 Procedure. Participants completing the survey on MTurk were asked to
open the survey in a separate window. The first page consisted of a consent form where
participants were informed of their rights and were cautioned against taking part in the
study if they had been diagnosed with any psychological difficulties related to their
combat experience. In order to express their consent to taking part in the study,
participants were asked to check a box at the bottom of the page. If a participant checked
the box, s/he was taken to the survey.
While we invited any American soldier who had been deployed in Iraq and
Afghanistan to participate in the survey, many of the questions were asked in a manner
that tapped into the soldiers’ views of American soldiers in general. The section about the
general experience of their deployment directly addressed the soldier’s own experiences.
Although our preference would have been to ask about the veterans’ own incidents
involving harm-doing, our experiences in Study 1 and particularly the recommendations
of the veterans helping with the survey led us to ask these questions more generally,
about themselves or other soldiers they know. Thus our participants could respond based
on either what they had personally experienced or witnessed or alternatively, based on
what they had heard about from other soldiers. This would presumably make the survey
less threatening to our participants and would also encourage make them to respond to
questions truthfully, as we would not know whether they were referring to themselves or
other soldiers. We did not believe that this would invalidate our responses; our
respondents had experienced combat first hand and per the definition of moral injury by
Litz et al. (2009), learning about such events from other soldiers can also lead to
psychological difficulties. From the open-ended responses, it did seem that a number of
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participants were writing about their own experiences. For example one soldier wrote,
“shot it [civilian] with my gun.” There were several examples also of what they
witnessed: “One of the soldiers hit a kid who was asking for water.” A number of
participants did not respond to the items that directly asked about harming civilians, but
nevertheless answered the questions about how veterans reacted to these instances; this
further complicated interpretation of the data. Despite these difficulties, we recognized
that harm-doing would be very sensitive to recall and report for the soldier, so we were
not willing to focus solely on their own possible mistreatment of civilians. Again, this
decision was strongly encouraged by the veterans who helped us create the survey.
3.1.2 Materials. Once the survey was created we received feedback from veterans
who had taken part in our interviews to streamline the instrument further. As discussed
earlier, the survey items were divided into several sections. In the first section we asked
participants questions about their deployments to get a general sense of where they had
been deployed, how long they had been deployed and what role they had played during
their deployments. In the second section, the questions were geared at exploring their
relationship with the civilian population and what type of event led to harmful actions by
the soldiers. Primarily, we asked how much contact participants had with civilians, how
they characterized their interactions with the civilians and what emotional reactions they
had towards the locals. They were asked to choose the two emotions that best described
their reaction. The emotions included anger, sadness, compassion, sympathy, pity, guilt,
contempt, disgust, hate, fear, envy and admiration. In these two sections the responses
had to be based directly on their own experiences.
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In section three we were interested in particular events of harm. We asked
participants if they knew of incidents that had resulted in the mistreatment of civilians,
serious harm to a civilian or the killing of a civilian. We also asked our participants to
describe the event if they were comfortable doing so. We asked questions about how
perpetrating harm was experienced by the soldiers while still deployed and then when
they returned home to the U.S. We asked about the emotions felt, moral judgments of the
events, impact on self-perceptions, and coping success/failure when confronting the
event. In order to assess their affective response to the event we used a rating scale
anchored at 1 (“not at all”) and 7 (“extremely”) for the emotions relief, guilty, angry,
anxious, sad, happy, regret, shame and fear. To assess the moral judgments of the
incident we used 7-point bipolar scales with the items immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong–
right and unjustifiable-justifiable. In addition, we also asked participants how the event
affected their self-perceptions. All these scales were completed twice by the participants,
once for reactions during the deployment and again, in a subsequent section, for when the
soldier returned back to the U.S. Finally, we asked a few demographic questions about
age and gender and their approval of the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars (see Appendix 2
for complete survey).
3.1.3 Participants. A total of 90 veterans responded to our survey. Of these
veterans 58 had been deployed in Iraq, 30 had been deployed in Afghanistan and 14 had
been deployed in other places including Qatar, the Gulf, and Vietnam, and one had
served only in the U.S. To be more consistent in our analyses we removed the three
participants who said that they had served in Vietnam and the one participant who had
only served in the U.S.. Looking at the number of times that these soldiers had been
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deployed, 63% (58 participants) had been deployed once. Another 24 (26%) participants
said that they had been deployed twice. However there were two participants who said
that they had been deployed three times and five others who had been deployed four
times. The number of months cumulatively that each of these veterans had been deployed
ranged from 3 months to 36 months. However there was one participant who reported
that he had been deployed for 63 months. He had deployed four times and had served
both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our participants ranged in age from 19 to 61 years. In looking at the modal age
we found that there were two modes – 24 years and 27 years. Our sample consisted of 61
male veterans and 26 female veterans. In all the analyses that we conducted we examined
the data for gender differences but did not find any. Therefore, gender will not be
discussed further. In terms of the duties they carried out during their deployment, 19 were
involved in search operations, 21 in intelligence, 29 driving in convoys, 8 in media, 21
worked at checkpoints, 15 in prisoner transport, 12 in development work, 17 in technical
support, 18 in medical support and 19 in transport. Eight other veterans also said that they
had engaged in other duties such as airfield security, motor pool and cooking (see Figure
1).
3.2 Results
The main purposes of data analyses were to learn what type of event commonly
caused harm to civilians, whether there was a difference in the way soldiers felt about
these events while they were in the battlefield, and when they returned home and how
they coped with such experiences.

38

We first began by looking at what type of interaction with civilians our
respondents had had. We also examined how veterans experienced their interaction with
civilians in general. Responding to the question “How would you describe your
interactions with civilians?” 58% of the participants (53 participants) said that they were
cautious but friendly. A total of 21(23%) participants said that they were cautious, 11
(12%) participants said that they were friendly and 1 (1%) participant said that they were
hostile. Two participants (2%) said that they had no contact with civilians while one
participant (1%) said that it ranged from hostile to friendly depending on the situation.
Furthermore, in terms of the veterans’ emotional reaction to civilians, the most chosen
responses were sympathy (48 participants or 53%), compassion (32 participants or 35%)
and sadness (30 participants or 33%). The number of participants who chose each of the
other emotions were as follows: fear (22 participants or 24%), pity (21 participants or
23%), guilt (18 participants or 20%), dislike (16 participants or 17%), anger and
contempt (14 participants or 15%), admiration (13 participants or 14%), envy (9
participants or 10%), disgust (8 participants or 8%) and hate (4 participants or 4%).
Overall, it seemed that our respondents had not had overly negative interactions with
civilians and did not feel ill will towards them.
The next step in analyzing the experiences of the soldiers in the battlefield was to
look at whether they had reported any knowledge of perpetration of harm against
civilians. In order to explore this we looked at the participants’ responses to the question
about what they had knew about incidents that caused harm to civilians. A total of 26
participants said that they had witnessed civilians being mistreated, 19 said that they
knew of instances where civilians had been harmed and nine said that they knew of
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instances when civilians were killed (see Figure 2). Overall 41 participants, less than half
of our respondents, answered this question. We also asked them to describe the event if
they felt comfortable doing so. However, only a handful of participants described such
an incident. Another said that he had witnessed civilians being caught in the crossfire.
Others described having witnessed a soldier hitting a child who had asked for water,
soldiers making lewd gestures behind the backs of locals, stealing valuables from a
person of importance and generally being abusive towards civilians. Two participants
also said that they did not wish to elaborate on the events that they had witnessed. From
their comments it was fairly clear that they had witnessed these events firsthand. It should
be noted that the majority of participants refused to respond to both these questions. We
believe that this is another example of the reluctance of veterans to speak of these
incidents. It is interesting that though they did not respond to these questions they still
continued on to complete the rest of the survey pertaining to the perpetration of harm. In
order to make sure that those who had not responded to the questions were not
qualitatively different, we conducted each analysis for all the participants and then for
just those who had responded to these questions. While there were differences in the
intensity of their experiences, the patterns of relationship between the variables were
similar (see below).
We then looked at whether our respondents perceived differences in the way a
harmful action was viewed once a soldier had returned from a combat theatre. In order to
do this, we conducted repeated measures analysis with the emotion measures that were
used to asses emotional reactions to an event while in combat (time 1) and then when
they returned to the U.S. (time 2). We found that our prediction that soldiers would feel
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more guilt and shame when they returned home was supported by these analyses. Thus
we found that participants believed that soldiers would feel significantly more guilt (F =
4.23, df = 1, p = .04) and shame (F = 12.33, df = 1, p =.001) after they had returned to the
US. The mean for guilt for the combat theatre was 3.47 and for when they returned back
home it was 3.89. For shame we saw a similar pattern; the combat theatre mean was 2.75,
and the mean for when the soldiers returned was 3.40.
We also found that our respondents believed soldiers would be significantly more
relieved (F = 95.44, df = 1, p =.00) when they returned home. They also said that soldiers
would experience far less anger (F = 16.13, df = 1, p = .00), anxiety (F = 28.05, df = 1, p
= .00), fear (F = 53.04, df = 1, p = .00), sadness ( F = 7.82, df = 1, p = .006), and more
happiness (F = 86.53, df = 1, p = .00) after they returned home (see Table 1 for means).
In addition to the differences in affect we also looked at possible differences in moral
judgments about the incident. Keeping with our prediction, repeated measures analyses
found that veterans thought soldiers would judge the incident significantly more immoral
(F =8.49, df = 1, p = .005), wrong (F = 7.63, df = 1, p = .007) and bad (F = 6.39, df = 1, p
= .01) once they returned home from their deployment. The means for the each of these
items (with lower numbers indicating harsher judgments) were as follows: immoralmoral (combat M = 4.60; home M = 4.16), wrong-right (combat M = 4.54; home M =
4.15) and bad–good (combat M = 4.50; home M = 4.11). In addition, we looked at the
correlations between the emotions of guilt and shame and moral judgments at the same
time (deployment and home) and across times. Since shame and guilt were correlated at r
= .60, we combined them at each time point to create guilt/shame composite scores for
time 1 and time 2. Further, given that the four moral judgment ratings were highly

41

correlated, we combined them to create composite moral judgment totals for time 1 and
time 2.
We found that higher levels of guilt and shame while being deployed were
associated with harsher moral judgment at the time (r = -.48, p <.001). A similar pattern
was seen with the feelings and moral judgments at time 2; again higher levels of guilt and
shame were associated with harsher moral judgments (r = -.57, p <.001). In addition we
also found that feelings of guilt and shame while being deployed were associated with
harsher moral judgments when they returned home (r = .-38, p <.001) and feelings of
guilt and shame at time 2 were also related to harsher moral judgments of time 1 (r = .36, p = .001). However, controlling for guilt and shame at time 1, a regression analysis
found that guilt and shame at time 2 did not have an effect on moral judgments at time1.
Similarly, guilt and shame at time 1 did not predict moral judgments at time 2 above and
beyond feelings of guilt and shame at time 2 (see Table 2 for regression analyses).
The same pattern of findings were seen when we conducted the regression
analyses for just participants who reported incidents of harm. We further explored how
respondents who had reported incidents differed from those who did not respond to these
questions. Regarding guilt and shame, we found a main effect (F = 9.85, df = 1, p = .000)
such that overall, those who responded to the question about incidents of harm showed
lower levels of guilt and shame (M = 2.8) than did those who had not reported such
incidents (M = 3.9). Further, those who reported incidents of harm were more lenient (M
=3.99) in their moral judgments than those who did not report such incidents (M = 4.87)
(F = 8.84, df = 1, p = .004).
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Regarding self-perceptions, the more immoral respondents believed the incident
would be judged. The more they believed self-perceptions would change (r = -.23, p =
.03). Similarly they also thought that the more a soldier thinks about the event the harsher
they would judge the incident (r = -.31, p =.003). Looking at the overall means for these
two variables, it was quite clear that both at time 1 and time 2 our respondents believed
that the incident would change the soldiers self-perceptions somewhat (time 1, M = 2.9;
time 2 M = 2.9). In terms of how much they believed soldiers would think about the
event, they again believed that they would do so “sometimes” to a “a lot” (time 1, M =
3.2; time 2, M = 3.2).
We also examined whether participants discussed their experiences and with
whom they did so. A total of 36 participants said that they talked to someone in the chain
of command, 53 said they spoke to a friend in the military, 18 said they spoke to a friend
who was not in the military, 37 to their spouses, 23 their parents, 13 their sibling and 37
said they spoke to a therapist. Two persons said that they had spoken to a chaplain/priest
while another person said someone who was not involved in their daily lives so that they
didn’t have to meet the person often.
Our analyses also looked at how approval for the war affected the responses to
our main dependent variables. It must be noted that approval for both the Iraq (M = 3.47)
and the Afghan wars (M = 3.78) were around the mean of the scale. Interestingly we
found that lower approval of the Iraq war was associated with higher levels of perceived
guilt (r = -.34, p = .00), perceived shame (r = -.25, p = .02) and perceived anger (r = -27,
p = .01) at time 2. However, we did not see the same relationship for the guilt, shame and
anger that they felt while deployed. Similarly, lower approval of the Afghan war was
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associated with higher levels of perceived guilt (r = -.44, p = .00), perceived shame (r = .21, p = .04) and perceived anger (r = -38, p = .00) after veterans returned home.
However, lower approval for the Afghan war was also associated with higher levels of
perceived guilt (r = -.28, p = .00) and perceived shame (r = -.30, p = .04) even while they
were still deployed.
3.3 Discussion
This survey proved useful in furthering our understanding of the impact that
harm-doing during a deployment has on a soldier. As predicted, our respondents
indicated that while still deployed soldiers felt less guilt and shame than when they
returned back home. They also stated that soldiers were likely to feel more relieved and
happy when they returned, and would be less angry, anxious, less fearful and less sad
about the event than when they were still deployed. Interestingly, then, as might be
expected. most emotions moved in the positive direction once the soldiers left the war
theatre; the two exceptions were shame and guilt, which increased once the they returned
home. We also found that the harm-doing behavior was judged more harshly i.e.,
perceived as more immoral) when soldiers returned home than when they were still
deployed. This supports our prediction that context based morality may be impacting how
harm-doing is perceived. It does seem that different standards were being used to judge
the behavior in the different contexts.
The complexity of dealing with harm caused in the battlefield is evident from the
fact that the majority of our participants chose not to answer the specific questions about
the harmful incident even though they went on to complete the rest of the survey,
entirely. In addition, this might have been compounded by the fact that they were
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responding to a survey from someone they did not know at all. It was clear from
responses that our participants were most comfortable talking about such events with
either someone in the military or their closest family members. Therefore, perhaps it is
not surprising that they were reluctant to divulge such information in this survey.
Interestingly, we also found that lower approval for the Iraq and Afghan war was
associated with higher levels of guilt, shame and anger when soldiers returned home.
This is also not surprising because it is quite possible that if they do not believe in the
mission, they have no way of rationalizing their behavior. However, it was also found
that lower support for the Afghan war was associated with higher levels of guilt and
shame during the deployment itself. Generally we found that there was much less
approval of the Iraq war than the one in Afghanistan among our participants. This is also
a reflection of the general social discourse about the war in the U.S. The war in
Afghanistan is generally seen as the just war, while the Iraq war is seen less favorably.
There were several comments about this in the comments section that made it clear that
our participants were thinking in the same manner. One soldier said “We had no business
getting involved in Iraq the way we did. The American public was duped.” Therefore, it
is possible that those who have lower levels of approval for the Afghan war were in
general less positively disposed towards the idea of war, conflict and violence and
therefore were more likely to see such situations as guilt and shame provoking.
The most significant shortcoming in this study was that we were unable to
pinpoint exactly who had perpetrated the harm-doing that was reported. Responses to
open-ended questions suggested that participants were responding based on incidents
they were involved in either as the person perpetrating the harm or someone witnessing
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the harm being perpetrated. In the latter case we could not be certain if they were
responding based on feelings associated with being a witness or based on what they
thought the perpetrator was experiencing. To complicate the situation, since participants
had the choice of not responding to this question, and many of them didn’t; we were not
able to gauge whose experiences were the source for their responses to the items in the
remainder of the survey. Those who did not respond to the harm-doing questions reported
higher levels of guilt and shame a soldier would feel and harsher moral judgments as
well. It is not clear whether these were overestimates of others’ responses or accurate
reports of their own (or others’) experiences that they were unwilling to divulge directly.
However, it must be noted that both groups—those who did and did not report harmdoing--believed that both at time 1 and 2 soldiers would experience considerable guilt
and shame, and both groups viewed the perpetration of harm as fairly immoral. However,
the fact that we were still able to find the evidence supportive of our predictions in this
study, despite our recruitment requirements (not being diagnosed with PTSD) essentially
left out those who were most likely to have engaged in harm-doing, was still impressive.
The most heartening aspect of this study was the comments we received from our
participants. While it must be noted that only a few of our respondents added comments,
we did not receive a single negative comment. They were in general very encouraging
and supportive of our research. One veteran wrote, “Good survey. Hope it helps with
helping the men and women who will never be the same due to these wars!!!” Another
said “It was a good survey for soldiers and loved ones of soldiers to take.” “Thank you
for conducting this and asking important questions,” said another in the comments
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section. These sentiments were very encouraging to read and validated the importance of
our attempts to understand the experiences of these veterans.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
Following from the previous studies, the aim of Study 3 was to isolate why our
veteran reported that self-perceptions were impacted negatively when they returned
home. We predicted that context based morality would be key to understanding this
phenomenon. Using a description of a combat situation we elicited either interpersonal or
intergroup moral standards and then examined if harm-doing in an intergroup situation
was seen as less immoral than in the interpersonal situation.
4.1 Method
The study design was a 2 (interpersonal vs. intergroup moral standard saliency) X
2 (ingroup vs. outgroup harmdoer) with a separate control condition that represented a
default moral standard. This default condition made interpersonal moral standards salient,
but signified a default standard in that it was set in an urban environment rather than a
war setting. We expected to find the least harsh judgments in the intergroup moral
condition where the harmdoer was of the ingroup and the harshest punishments in the
outgroup interpersonal harmdoer condition. The order of the different conditions in terms
of the harshness of the punishments was expected to be as follows: outgroup
interpersonal harmdoing, ingroup interpersonal harmdoing, outgroup intergroup
harmdoing and ingroup intergroup harm doing. Additionally, we predicted that the
harshest of all judgments would be seen in the default condition, outside of the war
setting.
4.1.1 Materials. In order to create a scenario that would involve harm to civilians,
we used an excerpt from the book Collateral Damage: American’sWar Against Iraqi
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Civilians (2009) by Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian. The excerpt described the
uncertainty that soldiers felt while they were standing at a checkpoint and their reaction
to an incident when a car did not stop when the soldiers ordered it to do so. In this study
we used scenarios to manipulate the perpetrator’s group identity and interaction type. In
order to manipulate ingroup and ourgroup, participants read that the incident either took
place at a American checkpoint in Iraq or at a Russian checkpoint in Chechnya (see
Appendix 3 for scenarios). In the interpersonal interaction condition, intended to make
interpersonal moral standards salient, the perpetrator was described as a soldier manning
the checkpoint. We attempted to individuate the soldier and the victim by providing
personal information about them, such as names, and by describing their thoughts and
feelings during the events. In the group interaction conditions, intended to make
intergroup moral standards salient, the perpetrators were a group of soldiers manning the
checkpoint. The soldier who fired at the civilian was not identified and no individuating
information about the soldiers or the victim were included. In the separate fifth
condition, the perpetrator was described as an off-duty police officer who was standing
by a barricade set up at the scene of a drive-by shooting incident; the victim as someone
who was driving toward the barricade and failed to stop.
Participants then responded to a number of scale items to gauge their responses to
the incident and the judgments of the harmdoer. The first items in the questionnaire dealt
with participants’ judgments of the perpetrator and the victim. Participants were asked
how good / bad the soldier was, how moral / immoral the soldier was, how justified the
soldier was in shooting at the civilian, how much the soldier should be punished, how
much the soldier is to blame for the civilians death, how much the driver is to blame for
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the death, how much empathy the participants felt toward the soldier, how much empathy
the participants felt toward the driver, how guilty the soldier felt, and how much guilt the
soldier should feel. In addition, participants also completed polar scale indicating their
affective responses to the event. Participants were asked to rate their affective responses
to the event using a scale anchored at 1 (“not at all”) and 7 (“extremely”) for angry, sad,
guilty, proud, disgusted, ashamed, surprised, and fear. Similarly they also completed
another set of 7-point bipolar scales about their perceptions of the soldier’s behavior. The
items were immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong-right, unacceptable-acceptable,
inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest, irresponsible–responsible, and uncommon–
common. Finally participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire that
included information about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, years of schooling and
political affiliation.
4.1.2 Procedure. Once participants had read and signed the consent form they
were provided with a packet containing the study material. Participants read the event
description and completed the questionnaire. They were then debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
4.2 Results
As a precursor to the main analyses, we created composite scores for our main
dependent variables. The six negative affect items (angry, sad, fear, disgust, ashamed and
guilty) formed a reliable scale (α = .80) and were therefore combined to form the
Negative Emotion scale. A Moral Total scale was also created (α =.88) and included
immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong--right, unacceptable--acceptable, inexcusable–
excusable, and irresponsible–responsible. The pairs “dishonest–honest” and
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“uncommon–common” were not included in the scale, as they exhibited low inter-item
correlations and decreased the scale reliability.
The following items, anchored 1 (“not at all) to 9 (“extremely), were combined
into a single Soldier Judgment scale (α = .85): “How justified was(were) the
soldier(s)/police officer shooting at the car?”; “In your opinion how good or bad would
you rate the soldier’s (soldiers’)/police officer’s behavior?”; “In your opinion how moral
or immoral would you rate the soldier’s (soldiers’)/police officer’s behavior?”; “In your
opinion do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should be punished? (reverse-scored)”;
“How empathic do you feel toward the soldier(s)/police officer? (reverse-scored)”; and
“How blameworthy do you think the soldier(soldiers)/ police officer is(are) for the
death?”
The two items related to perceptions of the driver (i.e., the victim)--“How
empathic do you feel toward the driver?” and “How blameworthy do you think the driver
is for the death?”-- were analyzed separately because of the low inter-item correlations.
In addition, the two items of guilt judgment “How guilty do you think the
soldier(s)/police officer feels about the death of the woman?” and “ How guilty do you
think the soldier(s)/police officer should feel?” were also analyzed separately because
they were considered orthogonal (and were in fact uncorrelated).
Correlations between the major dependent variables are reported in Table 3. We
found that the variables were correlated in expected patterns. For example it was found
that the higher participants scored on Soldier Judgment the more guilty they believed the
soldier should feel (r = -.5, p < .01) and lower scores on Soldier Judgment were also
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associated with more blame to the driver (r = -.41, p <.01) and the lower levels of
empathy with the driver (r = -.35, p <.01).
The main analyses were first conducted as 2 (interpersonal vs. intergroup context)
X 2 (ingroup vs. other group) ANOVAs. We did not find any significant differences on
the Negative Emotions scale or the Moral Judgment scale. However an exploration of
single emotion items found a main effect of context (interpersonal vs. intergroup) on fear
(F = 4.43, df = 1, p = .03). It appeared that participants reading the interpersonal
interaction were more fearful (M = 3.3) than those reading the intergroup interaction (M =
2.5). In addition, perpetrator group affiliation had a significant effect on scores for the
disgust item (F = 8.02, df = 1, p = .005). This was an intergroup bias effect, with those
reading about an outgroup perpetrator reporting more disgust (M = 3.8) than those
reading about an ingroup perpetrator (M = 2.7).
Most important, there was a significant main effect for how guilty the participants
thought the soldier felt (F = 11.16, df = 1, p = .001). Participants for whom the
interpersonal context was salient felt that the soldier felt more guilty (M = 7.8) than those
for whom the intergroup context was salient (M = 6.8). Further, for the item “How guilty
do you think the soldier(s)/police officer should feel?” participants showed a main effect
for whether the perpetrator was an ingroup or outgroup member (F = 6.21, df = 1, p =
.014). Participants who read that the perpetrator was an ingroup member responded with
lower scores (M = 6.9) than those who read about an outgroup perpetrator (M = 7.9).
This first set of analyses did not include the default condition of the police officer
shooting at a car. Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs that included all five
conditions (ingroup–interpersonal, ingroup–group, outgroup–interpersonal, outgroup–
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group and the default condition) which allowed us to compare each condition to the
other. An analysis of the Soldier Judgment revealed that the conditions differed on how
immoral they rated the harmdoer (F = 5.27, df = 2, p = .006). Post hoc analyses showed
that that default condition belonged to the subset of the harshest judgment, and they
differed from the other three conditions, ingroup –interpersonal, outgroup interpersonal
and ingroup - group. The outgroup group condition was seen in both these subsets. A
similar pattern of findings emerged for Moral Total (F = 3.4, df = 4, p = .01). Again post
hoc analyses found that the default condition and the outgroup–group condition were
clustered together and ingroup-interpersonal, ingroup group, outgroup – interpersonal and
outgroup – group conditions also formed the other subset. Therefore, it seemed that the
default condition resulted in harsher judgments than did the other four conditions.
Finally, the five conditions also differed also on the single item “How guilty do you think
the soldier/police officer feels,” (F = 10.69, df = 2, p = .001). Post hoc analyses found
that ingroup–group, outgroup–group and outgroup–interpersonal conditions did not differ
from one another, but did differ from the default condition and ingroup–interpersonal
condition clustered together
4.3 Discussion
This study revealed some evidence of the use of context based morality in making
judgments about the perpetration of harm. Most interesting was the findings regarding
how participants understood the feelings of the harmdoer. In keeping with our predictions
and replicating the information provided by the participants in studies 1 and 2, we found
that participants who read the interpersonal context scenario believed that the harmdoer
felt guiltier than the harmdoer in the intergroup context scenario. There seems to be an
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implicit understanding that in the interpersonal context the perpetrator used a moral
standard that was less accepting of causing harm to others, while the harmdoer in the
intergroup context used a moral standard that allowed him to assuage guilt that resulted
from his behavior.
While we did not see a significant difference overall in the negative emotions felt
by the participants towards the harmdoer, we did find that moral context had an effect on
fear. Participants reading the interpersonal interaction reported feeling more fear than did
those reading the intergroup interaction. Someone who harms others in general is not
good for group living, either from a survival point of view or a group cohesion point of
view, and is apt to engender fear. However, in the intergroup context, having someone
willing to cause harm for the group’s protection can be regarded as beneficial to the
group. Therefore, this finding is consistent with our general theoretical framework.
The data did not show that participants’ blame of the harmdoer, at least in the war
situation, waswere impacted by the differential use of interpersonal and intergroup moral
standards. However, it should be noted that the default condition harmdoer (police
officer) was consistently judged significantly more negatively than the harmdoer in the
interpersonal or intergroup contexts. This may still provide some support for our
hypothesis that interpersonal and intergroup moral standards are used differentially to
make judgments of a harmdoer. War situations, even if the targets involved are
dramatically individuated, still primes some degree of groupiness, whereas the default
condition we used was clearly a situation where our basic interpersonal moral standards
would operate. Not finding judgments impacted by the interpersonal moral standards in
the interpersonal context could be an artifact of this embedded groupiness. The fact that
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the target in the default condition was treated more harshly than those in the war related
conditions also reveals an interesting fact. It seems that war automatically institutes a
moral environment where the rules are less harsh regarding harming others, even if the
context in this environment is interpersonal in nature.
We also found a general intergroup bias where participants reported that they felt
more disgust when they read information about an outgroup harmdoer, and the same
pattern was seen in response to how much guilt participants believed the harmdoer should
feel. However, it is also interesting that this bias was only seen in these two items and not
more. It augurs well for our contention that be it an ingroup or an outgroup, harm is
generally judged more leniently in intergroup situations than in an interpersonal
interaction. Further it also replicates the findings of our previous two studies.
However, a limitation of the study was that we were not able to get moral
judgments of the soldier to change based on the type of interaction. While it was clear
that interpersonal moral standards were being used in the default moral condition, we
were not able to demonstrate this difference in the context of war. Presumably this could
be because war in itself is an intergroup interaction situation and therefore it might be
difficult to perceive as an interpersonal interaction as such. Secondly, due to the current
climate of awareness that the U.S. is involved in two wars overseas and recognition of the
personal sacrifice these soldiers have undergone to serve the country, participants might
find it difficult to judge them as being less than moral.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4
While we had some experimental evidence for the differential use of interpersonal
and intergroup moral standards in Study 3, it was based on moral judgments made by
others. However, as discussed in the introduction, self-blame may be critical to the
psychological impact of harm-doing. Further, given the possible reluctance to blame
American soldiers (i.e., those fighting for us), it seemed possible that substituting the self
for others might allow for greater attributions of blame. Therefore, in this study in
addition to differences in moral judgments made with interpersonal and intergroup moral
standards, we also explored whether judgments of harm-doing differed for the self and
another.
5.1 Method
Study 4 was conducted as a 2 (recall context: battlefront/home) X 2 (judgment;
self/other) between subjects experiment. Using a brief description of a combat incident
that was set in the streets of Iraq (see Appendix 4), we tried to examine if there were
differences in how a perpetration of harm was judged on the battlefront and when the
soldier returned home. In addition we also investigated differences in moral judgments of
the self and others. The scenario was set either in a bunker in the battlefront (combat) or a
bar (civil society). The assumption was that when participants read about the soldier in a
bunker, intergroup moral standards would emerge; reading about the soldier who had
returned home would produce interpersonal moral standards. We hypothesized that under
conditions of intergroup moral standards, the behavior would to be judged less harshly
than in the situation where interpersonal moral standards were salient. In addition the
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questionnaire also manipulated if our participants were making these judgments about
themselves or others. As discussed earlier, looking glass self-perceptions mean that
generally people will judge themselves based on how they believe others judge them.
Given the unique nature of the experience we are asking them to imagine, it is possible
that participants may use interpersonal moral standards throughout, whereas when they
are making judgments about a soldier, the soldier may always be seen as engaging in
intergroup actions, which leads to more lenient judgments. In order to explore these
hypotheses we asked the participants to make judgments about the harmful behavior
either for themselves or as a third person observer.
5.1.1 Participants. A total of 113 (78 female and 34 male) students from UMass,
Amherst took part in the study for extra class credit. The sample was predominantly
White (70%) and ranged in age from 18 to 34 years.
5.1.2 Materials. Participants first read an adapted version of the scenario used in
study 3. The first brief section outlined the ambiguity and the tenseness of the battlefield.
They then completed a set of five anagrams. These anagrams, we hoped, would create
some temporal distance between the two parts of the experimental material that the
participants were required to read. Creating this temporal distance seemed especially
important when trying to establish interpersonal morals – that is, when the target
experienced the event in the battlefield but was recalling it in a civilian setting (back in
the US).
After the anagrams half of the participants received a description of a soldier
recalling the event in a bunker (intergroup moral conditions) while the other half had a
description of the soldier recalling the event after returning home (interpersonal morals
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condition). Participants then responded to a number of scale items to gauge their
responses to the incident and their judgments of the harmdoer. The first items in the
questionnaire dealt with participant judgments of the perpetrator and the victim.
Participants were asked how good/bad the soldier was, how moral/immoral the soldier
was, how justified the soldier was in shooting at the civilian, how much the soldier
should be punished, how much the soldier is to blame for the civilians death, how much
the driver is to blame for the death, how much empathy the participants felt toward the
soldier, how much empathy the participants felt toward the driver, how guilty the soldier
felt and how ashamed the soldier felt. In addition, participants also indicated their
affective responses to the event using 7-point scales anchored “not at all” to “extremely”
for angry, sad, guilty, proud, disgusted, ashamed, surprised, and fear. They also
completed 7- point bipolar scale regarding their perceptions of the soldier’s behavior. The
items were immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong--right, unacceptable--acceptable,
inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest, irresponsible–responsible, uncommon–
common. The final part of the experimental material was a demographic questionnaire
that included in questions about age, gender, ethnicity, religion, amount of schooling and
political affiliation (see Appendix 4 for complete material).
In order to compare responses for the self vs. another, when responding to these
measures participants were asked either: 1) to imagine that they were the soldier
engaging in the shooting of a civilian and to respond to the measures accordingly or 2) to
respond to the stimuli as a third person reading about the event. By doing this we were
able to manipulate self- perceptions and other- perceptions. For example in the selfperception condition participants were asked if they were justified in shooting at the
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civilian, while in the other-perception condition they were asked if they thought the
soldier was justified in shooting at the civilian. Finally they also completed a
demographic questionnaire that included questions about age, gender, ethnicity, religion,
and political affiliation.
5.1.3 Procedure. Participants were brought into the lab and were asked to first
sign a consent form. They were then given the study materials. Participants were
instructed to try their best to complete all the anagrams. However anyone who completed
at least three of them were included in the analyses. It was not important that they
completed the anagrams; rather we were more concerned that they spent adequate time
between reading the two sections. We believed that by merely spending time on trying to
complete the anagrams, participants would automatically create the temporal distance
between the two parts. Once they had completed the study materials they were debriefed
and thanked for their participation.
5.2 Results
We began our analysis by combining items for the different measures to create
subscale scores. We computed a Negative Emotion score using the items angry, sad,
fear, disgust, ashamed and guilty (α = .88). The single item “proud” stood independently.
The bipolar items measuring the morality of the target’s behavior were analyzed and it
was found that the items “dishonest–honest” and “uncommon–common” again showed
low inter-item reliability. Therefore the items immoral–moral, bad–good, wrong–right,
unacceptable– cceptable, inexcusable–excusable and irresponsible–responsible were
combined to create a Moral Total score (α = .90). The items dishonest–honest and
uncommon–common were also analyzed separately. To compute a Soldier Judgment
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score we combined the items: “How justified was the soldier shooting at the car?”; “In
your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier’s behavior?”; “In your opinion
how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier’s/your behavior?”; “In your opinion do
you think the soldier/you should be punished? (reverse scored)” and “ How blameworthy
do you think the soldier is/you are for the death? (reverse scored).” A reliability analysis
showed that this was reliable at α = .79. The items “How empathic do you feel you feel
toward the driver?” and “How blameworthy do you think the driver is for the death?” as
well as “How guilty do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s) about the death of the
woman?” and “How ashamed do you think (you / the soldier) feel(s) about the death of
the woman?” were analyzed separately.
The main analyses – univariate analyses with context of recall (battlefield / home)
and perspective (self / other) – were conducted for the main dependent variables (Moral
Total, Soldier Judgment, Negative Emotion and the single items. Although differences
were not found based on moral context, a number of differences arose based on self-other
perspective. The analysis for the single item “How guilty do you think (you / the soldier)
feel(s)” found a main effect of perspective (F = 6.62, df = 1, p =.01), with participants in
the self- perception condition believing that on average they would feel guiltier (M =
7.06) than they thought another person would feel (M = 6.15). The same pattern of
findings was also found for the single item “How ashamed do you think the soldier
feels…” (F = 6.17, df = 1, p = .01) with those in the self condition believing that they as
the soldier would feel more shame (M = 6.4) than the soldier when they made a third
person judgment (M = 5.4).
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Participants were also likely to say that they felt significantly more Negative
Emotion when they imagined themselves in the situation (M = 5.0) than when they were
making judgments about how the soldier would feel (M = 3.3) (F = 41.3, df = 1, p = .00).
Similarly, when participants imagined that they were the soldier, they were also
significantly less positive in their judgments about the soldier than when they were
making judgments about the soldier as a third person (F = 24.3, df = 1, p =.00). When
they imagined that they were the soldier the mean for the Soldier judgment was M = 3.7
and when they were making judgments about the soldier as a third person, the mean was
M = 5.2 (see Table 5 for summary).
5.3 Discussion
The key finding in this study was the manner in which participants were harsher
judging themselves than when judging others. This was a pattern that was seen on three
of the four main dependent variables. When participants were asked to imagine that they
were the soldier, participants tended to be harsher in their judgments of the soldier’s
behavior, thought they would feel more guilt and shame, and felt more negative emotions
about the behavior than when they were judging the behavior as a third person. The
findings suggest that moral transgressions by the self were considered more heinous and
worthy of outrage than the same moral transgression by another person, specifically
another soldier. These findings may reflect a combination of different factors. They may
be connected to the fact that we derive much of our self worth from seeing ourselves as
being moral. As discussed in the introduction we also believe that we are more moral
than the average person. This may mean that we hold ourselves to a higher moral
standard, and thus behaving in a manner that causes harm to another is regarded as
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extreme and unthinkable. It affects the core of who we are; knowing that one has
committed a moral transgressionmay elicit a harsh response and more negative emotion.
However, on the contrary it was also possible that we are unwilling to acknowledge such
transgression and thus there may be other reasons for this findings.
The difference in the manner the self is judged in comparison to another also
raises another interesting possibility. We could argue that interpersonal and intergroup
moral standards are being used differentially to make these judgments. It appears that
perhaps in the case of the self, participants are using interpersonal moral standards. When
imagining the self in such a situation, participants are thinking about how they personally
interact with the world. When the self is made salient, it precludes the emergence of
intergroup moral standards but facilitates interpersonal moral standards. However, it is
much easier to imagine a soldier who is serving his country, a soldier as a part of a group.
The default in such a situation is intergroup moral standards. This could be responsible
for the harsher judgments and the negative affect associated with self-perceptions, while
the other is treated more leniently. However, this idea requires further study. Both in
Study 3 and 4 we were not able to find clear evidence for how the judgments of soldiers
by others are impacted by interpersonal and intergroup moral standards. This maybe an
artifact of using combat related material, and so in the next study we decided to abandon
the use of such material and turn to more mundane transgressions.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 5
6.1 Method
In the current study we created material using an example of academic cheating.
This material was well suited to manipulating interpersonal and intergroup moral
standards and had the added benefit of being very relevant and familiar to our
participants. The study was conducted as a between subjects experiment with two
conditions based on who presumably benefited from the cheating-- the individual or the
group.
6.1.1 Materials. The experimental material included a brief description of an
incident of academic cheating. The short paragraph described how the student has
plagiarized well over half of his paper from a published source. In one form participants
were told that even though students were divided into groups, each student would get an
individual grade while in the other participants were told that students were working in a
group and that the whole group would get one grade. In responding to the accusation, the
target in question in the individual condition said that he had been busy and had only
plagiarized to get a good grade. In the other condition, the student was reported as saying
that he had been busy and had only plagiarized to make sure that the group grade did not
suffer. Participants were then asked to respond to the following scale items which were
anchored 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“extremely): “How justified do you think John was in
plagiarizing the paper?” “How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing the
paper?” “How guilty do you think John was about plagiarizing the paper?” “How
ashamed do you think John was about plagiarizing the paper?” “How guilty do you think
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John should feel about plagiarizing the paper?” and “How ashamed do you think John
should be about plagiarizing the paper?”
To gauge how our participants viewed the target we also used a scale anchored 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“extremely”) with the adjectives Competent, Sociable, Wellintentioned, Skillful, Trustworthy, Good-natured, Friendly, Confident, Moral, Warm,
Intelligent and Honest. Based on prior research (Usoof-Thowfeek, Janoff-Bulman and
Tavernini, 2011) we grouped these adjectives to create three separate subscales:
Competence (Competent, Skillful, Confident and Intelligent,α = .57), Morality (Wellintentioned, Trustworthy, Moral and Honest, α = .68) and Warmth (Sociable, Goodnatured, Friendly and Warm, = .69)). We also included bipolar 7-point scales to assess
how participants judged the incident of cheating. The items were immoral–moral, wrong–
right, bad–good, unacceptable–acceptable, inexcusable–excusable, dishonest–honest and
irresponsible – responsible. These items were combined to create a Moral Total score (α
= .89). Participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire which asked about
age, gender, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation.
6.1.2 Participants.

A total of 50 participants from the University of

Massachusetts, Amherst took part in our study. Our participants ranged from ages 18 to
23 years and included 29 females and 21 males. A total of 33 participants identified as
White.
6.1.3 Procedure. Participants came into the laboratory and were asked to sign a
consent form. They were then given the experimental materials and once they had
completed this they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
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6.2 Results
The primary analyses for this study took the form of one-way ANOVAs
(conditions: individual vs. group). The main dependent variables were Moral Total,
Competence, Morality and Warmth and the single items: “How guilty do you think John
feels about plagiarizing the paper?; “How ashamed do you think John feels about
plagiarizing the paper?”; “How guilty do you think the John should feel about
plagiarizing the paper?”; and “How ashamed do you think John should feel about
plagiarizing the paper?”
We found that participants in the individual condition saw the behavior as less
justified (M = 1.86) than those in the group condition (M = 2.7) (F = 4.1, df = 1, p =.04).
Participants in the individual condition also saw the target as being more blameworthy
(M = 8.6) than those in the group condition (M = 8.0) (F = 3.8, df =1, p = .05). Further,
participants in the individual condition also felt that the target should feel more guilty (M
= 7.2) than those in the group condition (M = 6.8) (F = 3.9, df = 1, p = .05). While
participants in the two conditions did not see the participants significantly different on the
dimensions of Warmth and Competence, they did differ in how they judged the person on
Morality. Individual condition participants judged the participant as being more immoral
(M = 2.2) than those in the group condition (M = 3.2) (F = 16.6, df = 1, p <.000).
Furthermore, this was also reflected in the Moral Total. Participants in the individual
condition saw the behavior as more immoral (M = 1.5) than did those in the group
condition (M = 2.2) (F = 3.89, df = 1, p = .05) (see Table 6 for summary means).
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6.3 Discussion
The current study demonstrated some interesting findings in terms of the
judgments based on interpersonal and intergroup moral standards. When the target was
described as having committed the same transgression on behalf of his group rather than
to benefit the self, participants saw the behavior as less immoral and the target as less
blameworthy, requiring less guilt and resulting in perceptions of greater. Interestinglu,
this was the case even though the behavior in the group condition was actually more
likely to harm others directly – that is lower grades of others in the plagiarist’s group.
This suggests that participants were using different standards to judge the target
depending on whether he was seen engaging in the behavior to benefit the group or doing
it for himself. This provides clearer evidence for context based moral standards.
However, we need to acknowledge that in general the behavior in the group
condition was still seen as immoral and the target was still not regarded as very justified,
but instead was seen in general as blameworthy and worthy of feeling guilty, as reflected
by the means for the main dependent measure. There wasn’t a shift from immoral to
moral based on the situation, but participants were more likely to excuse the behavior
because of group morals.
Of course cheating on a paper is obviously qualitatively very different from
perpetrations of harm during war. They differ both in the consequences and the intensity
of harm. Further, war is an inherently intergroup conflict situation. In the current study
the group condition involved ingroup benefit to the group, but not conflict between
groups. The harm from cheating is generally about flouting societal norms rather than
specific harm to another. However, we do have to acknowledge that these type of
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transgressions and their consequences are very real to our participants. Notwithstanding
the limitations in comparing academic cheating to perpetration of harm in combat, these
findings nevertheless demonstrate the use of context based moral standards and the fact
we could demonstrate the impact of intergroup morals in the absence of conflict is
noteworthy.
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, these five studies provide us with some insights into how
perpetrations of harm affect soldiers returning from war and how context based morality
may in part help explain these effects. All of the U.S. veterans with whom we discussed
our model, both in the interviews and in the focus group, unanimously agreed with our
proposition that there was a difference in the way an incident of harm would be
experienced and judged while being deployed versus when they returned home to the
U.S.. They agreed that this was because of the shift in moral standards with which the
behavior was being judged. The survey with veterans enabled us to replicate what our
veterans had described in terms of the differences in the affective response and moral
judgments of incidents of harm. Our analyses showed that our veterans believed that
when a soldier returned home negative feelings of guilt and shame associated with
incidents of harm were felt more strongly than while they were still deployed.
Furthermore, we also found that our veterans believed that the behavior would be seen as
more immoral when a soldier returned home than while deployed. This supports our
contention that while deployed soldiers are using intergroup moral standards and
therefore incidents of harm may not seem as drastic as they do when they return home
and revert to the default interpersonal moral standards.
These findings received some further support from our experimental findings. We
saw that participants had an understanding that soldiers would feel more guilt under
conditions of interpersonal morality. In study 3 using combat scenarios that manipulated
either interpersonal or intergroup morality, both for ingroups and outgroups, we were
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able to demonstrate that participants were aware that soldier s in situations in which
interpersonal moral standards are salient feel more guilt for causing harm than they
would in a similar intergroup situation. In the same study we also compared these
conditions with a transgression of the default interpersonal moral standard which was
situated in civil society. We found that this condition yielded the harshest judgments. It
allowed us to overcome some of the difficulties of trying to demonstrate interpersonal
transgressions in a situation (war / combat) that is inherently an intergroup interaction.
However, the fact that we were able to demonstrate differences between how an
interpersonal and intergroup moral transgression was felt (i.e., in terms of presumed guilt
and shame) in an inherently intergroup situation augurs well for the strength of this
phenomena. We were also able to demonstrate this phenomenon using the more mundane
example of academic cheating that again allowed us to overcome dealing with the
complexities of using combat situations for our experimental material. We were able to
clearly demonstrate both higher levels of guilt and shame and negative moral judgments
of a transgression in an interpersonal context in comparison to a group context.
Also, it was fairly clear that when asked to imagine themselves being involved in
harm-doing participants were much tougher on themselves than when they were asked to
judge a soldier engaging in the harm-doing. We found strong effects when we asked
participants to make self-judgments rather than other judgments. When making
judgments about the self our participants tended to be much harsher than when they were
making judgments about others. This could possibly be because when making judgments
about themselves, participants were naturally using interpersonal moral standards. Being
in combat is extraordinary and clearly difficult to truly imagine unless one has
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experienced it. Our participants, young college students, are therefore likely to rely on
their default morality when making the judgments about themselves in this imagined
context. However, a soldier who is committed to a mission and is dedicated to the wellbeing of the group is easier to imagine. As a soldier his role is defined relative to the
group. The intergroup moral standards that emerge in such a situation may be somewhat
intuitive, and therefore participants are liekly to make the more lenient judgments about
the soldier--the other.
Unfortunately, none of our experiments using combat scenarios yielded clear
evidence for how society at large may condemn such transgressions. While we had
predicted that incidents of harm would be judged more harshly once they returned home,
we did not find this. It is quite likely that our participants were reluctant to judge the
soldiers they were reading about harshly because of a sense of obligation that may stem
from the knowledge that it is inappropriate to criticize these soldiers who are sacrificing
so much for their county.
In addition, combat being an inherently intergroup situation, it is likely that a
soldier is seen as engaging in intergroup action and thus his/her behavior is judged based
on these standards. Therefore, it will be important to further examine this idea in
conditions removed from combat. This is supported by our findings in the last study
where we were able to elicit these moral judgments with a situation that was not combat
related. However, it must be remembered that this study did not replicate the intergroup
conflict that is so central to the combat scenarios that we were using. Therefore, in future
studies this should be taken into account and the scenarios, even if they are removed from
combat, should attempt to mirror the fundamental aspects of intergroup interaction.
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Despite these shortcomings, taken together these five studies provide some exciting
preliminary findings as to the experiences of soldiers and their psychological difficulties,
specifically reasons why incidents of harm may particularly impact soldiers when they
return from war. It appears that context-based moral standards are apt to be used and
thereby impact self-perceptions and emotions surrounding harm-doing. We hope that this
knowledge will contribute towards developing new interventions and methods to address
combat related harm-doing and the manner in which it impacts soldiers’ self-perceptions.
An understanding of context–based morality and how it affects an individual might
provide soldiers with the necessary tools to protect themselves when they are faced with
reintegrating into civil society and the more “judgmental” interpersonal moral standards
they are likely to confront.

71

Figure 1: Representation of the duties undertaken by our respondents during
deployments
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Figure 2: Reported incidents of perpetration of harm
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Table 1: Means for main dependent variables for Time 1 and Time 2
Variable

Mean (Time 1)

Mean (Time 2)

Relief

2.70

5.22

Guilt

3.47

3.89

Regret

3.70

3.86

Anger

4.71

3.87

Anxiety

5.02

4.12

Fear

4.82

3.24

Shame

2.77

3.40

Sadness

4.19

3.64

Happiness

2.77

4.76

Moral judgment 4.60

4.20

74

Table 2: Regression analyses looking at impact of Guilt and Shame on Moral Judgments
Moral Judgment (Time 1) Moral Judgment (Time 2)
Guilt and Shame (Time

-.22**

-.09

1)

(-3.85)

(-1.84)

Guilt and Shame (Time

-.08

-.20**

2)

(-1.53)

(-4.33)

t statistic within parentheses; **> .000
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Table 3: Correlations between main dependent variables
Soldier

Should

Neg.

Moral

Guilt

Guilt

Emotion

Total

Soldier Guilt

1

Should Guilt

.36**

1

Neg.

-.011

.25**

1

Moral Total

.012

-.31**

-.27**

1

Soldier J.

-.016

-.50**

-.30**

.63**

Soldier J.

Emotion

** <.001
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1

Table 4: Means comparison for main dependent variables across all five conditions
Variable

Ingroup –

Ingroup -

Outgroup –

Outgroup

Individual

Group

Individual

- Group

Moral Total

3.6

3.6

3.7

3.2

2.6

Soldier Judgment

4.7

4.5

4.4

3.9

3.2

Single item (Guilt)

8.0

6.4

7.5

7.0

7.8
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Table 5: Differences in self – other perceptions on main dependent variables
Variable

Mean

Mean

F

df

p

(Self)

(Other)

Negative Emotion

5.0

3.3

41.3

1

.000

Soldier Judgment

3.7

5.2

24.3

1

.000

Single item (Guilt)

7.0

6.1

6.62

1

.01

Single item (Shame)

6.4

5.4

6.17

1

.01
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Table 6: Means for main dependent variables for individual vs. group benefit conditions
Variable
Justified

Group
2.7

F
4.1

df
1

p
.04

Blameworthy 8.6

8.0

3.8

1

.05

7.2

6.8

3.9

1

.05

2.2

3.2

16.6

1

.000

Guilt
proneness
Target
Morality

Individual
1.8
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APPENDIX
RESEARCH MATERIAL
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INTERVIEW SCRIPT
Thank you for agreeing to an interview with us. (Researchers introduce
themselves, participants introduce themselves and audiotaping begins). We want to thank
you for taking part, but we also want you to know that like many other people in this
country, we are very thankful for your service in the military. It is an extraordinary
sacrifice on your part and we’re very grateful to you.
This interview is a first step in trying to explore the subject of how combat
experiences impact soldiers. In the next 90 minutes or so we want to ask you about some
ideas we have about the subject and see if they make sense. We want to learn from your
experiences and ask for your help in deciding how best to address these issues in future
research.
Specifically, we are interested in the psychological aftermath of war on our
veterans. The psychological distress that is associated with combat and military service,
in general, is often framed as the result of soldiers having to repeatedly confront their
own mortality, danger to their physical well-being and the awareness of their of own
vulnerability when either they themselves or their buddies are put in harm’s way. Having
to deal with these fears over and over again is thought to have severe consequences on
the psychological well-being of soldiers. We are not saying that these theories are wrong,
but we think that they ignore some important characteristics of modern combat and
therefore are incomplete.
Psychologists have recently started to accept that the experiences of soldiers
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan do not mirror those of what we call traditional combat as
was seen in World War I and II. With traditional combat there was a clear battlefield, you
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knew who the enemy was; you could clearly identify who you were fighting. So it was
easy to set rules of engagement. You could identify the enemy by the uniform they wore
and those were the people you would fight, you would shoot, you would kill. But all that
has changed. Combat today is different, especially when it involves urban warfare and
the enemy is using guerrilla tactics. These situations are ambiguous. You don’t know
who the enemy is, it might be the guy carrying the gun but it could also be the teenager
idling on the street corner, the pregnant woman approaching you or the man driving
towards a checkpoint. You are never sure of what you are dealing with. You might be
dealing with the enemy, but by the same token it might be an innocent civilian. To make
things worse, the fighting often takes place in the middle of highly populated areas. The
enemy might be counting on this to avoid attacks on themselves.
Under these very difficult conditions, your utmost concern has to be your survival
and the survival of your buddies. You would have had to make decisions about what was
necessary for survival and what was the best way to protect yourself. Survival under
these conditions means erring on the side of safety and protection. This might even mean
that you might have to harm someone in order to meet these goals, even if this someone
was a civilian. This adds another layer to the distress suffered by soldiers. That is why
we think that we need to have a new approach to fully understand the link between
combat experiences and their psychological consequences in these extraordinary
situations.
We are particularly interested in trying to understand the effect these sorts of
incidents have on a soldier. How do you decide how to act in these ambiguous
situations? We are very interested in your feelings about yourself and how they differed
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when you were in Iraq or Afghanistan and when you returned home. What comes to mind
when you think about the combat situations that you have witnessed or that you have
heard about? We are interested in not only your own experiences but also situations
involving others, incidents you witnessed and stories you have heard from others. We are
not looking for right or wrong answers. There is nothing too trivial to be discussed here.
All opinions are equally important and valuable to us. We are merely interested in getting
your thoughts, your opinions and gut feelings about this.
As the researchers involved in this project we are committed to make this a safe
experience for you. We want to reiterate that participation in this interview is voluntary.
If at any time you feel that you want a break or that you want to leave the interview you
can do so. Also, if in the process of talking you feel overwhelmed or want to talk to
someone other than the researchers, either let us know so we can put you in touch with
someone immediately or we also have contact information if you wish to speak to
someone later on.
As we outlined in the consent form we are going to take every precaution to make
sure that tapes, transcripts and any other material associated with this interview will be
stored safely and will only be available to Prof. Janoff-Bulman and me. When we
transcribe the tapes we will also avoid using names. We will also take every possible
precaution to maintain confidentiality. We can discuss any other questions you have
before we start.
Questions:
•

In your experience, what thoughts and feelings do you think are going through a
soldier’s mind when he or she is asked to go out on a mission?
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•

How would you describe your interactions with Iraqi and Afghan civilians? Do
you know of instances when civilians were harmed or killed because it was
impossible to know whether they were a danger to you or your buddies?

•

How did you or others deal with such experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan and
when you returned home? How did you see yourself when you were still
surrounded by your buddies? And when you returned home? Do you think there
is a difference in the way soldiers deal with such things while still in combat and
when they return home?

•

Do you think soldiers can talk about this to people back home when they return?

•

When soldiers return, do you think people here at home fully understand what the
soldiers have been through? Do you feel like soldiers can talk to people here and
feel that they are understood?

•

How do you think soldiers see their experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan when they
come back to the US? Do you think they change the way they perceive incidents
that they faced there when they are removed from the situation? (If yes) Why do
you think that happens?
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STUDY 2 MATERIAL
Please read the following information, carefully before you proceed to the survey. This
section has important information regarding the survey and your rights as a
participant.
You are invited to take part in this survey because you are a veteran of the US
military and have served in Iraq and / Afghanistan. We are trying to understand how the
combat experiences of soldiers impact the way they perceive themselves.
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. You can complete it
in a place where you feel your privacy is not compromised and can return it sealed in the
envelope provided, to the locked box at the Veterans’ Services Office lobby. The survey
consists of questions regarding the experiences of soldiers you know. You will not be
asked for any identifying information. You can refuse to answer any question or section
that you feel uncomfortable answering. All surveys will be stored in a locked cabinet in a
secure lab and only the primary investigator and the faculty sponsor will have access to
these surveys.
There is no known direct benefit to taking part in this study. However, we believe that the
information we gather will contribute towards understanding the psychological impact of
combat on soldiers and provide an alternative perspective in the creation of interventions
for this population. However, once the study is completed, we hope to give the Veterans’
Services Office a copy of the write up of our findings. The results of this study will also
be made available to participants at their request.
The survey should take approximately 20 minutes to complete. The survey includes
questions about what you might know about the experiences of soldiers who have served
either in Iraq and or Afghanistan. You may choose to skip questions or sections of the
survey. All research data will be stored in a locked safe in a secure lab space and will be
destroyed five years after the research is complete.
Thinking about the battlefield when answering this survey has the potential to cause
psychological discomfort. If at any point, you wish to talk to someone about the
discomfort you are feeling please contact Mental Health Services on campus on 413-5452337 or the psychological services center on 413-545-0041 or contact the researchers,
Ramila Usoof MS, rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-5450264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu. We will arrange for you to meet with a clinician or
therapist.
The following procedures will be used to protect the confidentiality of your study records.
The researchers will keep all study records (including any codes to your data) in a secure
location locked in a filing cabinet in a secure lab. Research records will be labeled with a
code. No names will be associated with the surveys. At the conclusion of this study, the
researchers may publish their findings. Information will be presented in summary format
and you will not be identified in any publications or presentations. There is an exception to
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confidentiality we need to make you aware of. As social science researchers, it is our ethical
responsibility to report situations of child abuse, child neglect, or any life-threatening
situation to appropriate authorities.
If you have further questions about this project or if you have a research-related problem,
you may contact the principal investigator, Ramila Usoof MS., at
rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie Janoff-Bulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or
janbul@psych.umass.edu or Melinda Novak, Chair of the Psychology Department at 413545-5958 or mnovak@psych.umass.edu. If you have any questions concerning your
rights as a research subject, you may contact the University of Massachusetts Amherst
Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at (413) 545-3428 or
humansubjects@ora.umass.edu.
You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to. If you agree to be in the study, but
later change your mind, you may drop out at any time. There are no penalties or
consequences of any kind if you decide that you do not want to participate.
The University of Massachusetts does not have a program for compensating subjects for
injury or complications related to human subjects research, but the study personnel will
assist you in getting treatment.

Please check the following box if you have read the information above and consent
to participating in the study
I have read this form and decided that I will participate in the project described
above. The general purposes and particulars of the study as well as possible
hazards and inconveniences have been explained to my satisfaction. I understand
that I can withdraw at any time.
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1. In which country/countries have you served? (Please check all that apply)
__Iraq
__Afghanistan
specify)____________________

__Other (Please

2. How many times have you been deployed?
____One

____Two

____Three

____More than three

3. Overall, how many months did you serve in Iraq and/or Afghanistan?
______ months
4. During the time you served in Iraq or Afghanistan in what type of activities were
you involved? (Check all that apply)
____Search operations
____Intelligence gathering
____Driving in a convoy ____Media
____Manning checkpoints ____Prisoner transportation
____Development work
____Providing technical support
____Medical support
____Transport
____Other (Please specify)____________________
5. Did you feel that you had received adequate training to accomplish these tasks
successfully?
____Yes

____Somewhat

____No

6. How important was it for you to make sure everyone in your unit was safe?
____Not at all
____Somewhat
Important
Important

____Important

____Extremely
Important

7. How important was it for you to make sure that soldiers returned safe from a
mission?
____Not at all
____Somewhat
Important
Important

____Important

____Extremely
Important

8. How important was it for you to make sure that you returned home to the US
safely?
____Not at all
____Somewhat
Important
Important

____Important
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____Extremely
Important

If you have had multiple deployments, think of the one when you had the most contact
with civilians and please respond to the questions below.
9. How much contact did you have with civilians? (Check one)
____No contact
____Less than once a month
____Two or three times month
____A few times a week
____Almost every day
____Several times a day
10. How would you describe your interactions with civilians? (Check one)
____Hostile
____Friendly

____Cautious
____Cautious but friendly
____Other (Please specify)___________________

11. What did you feel towards these Iraqi or Afghani civilians? Check the two words
that best describe your feelings towards them.
____Anger
____Hate
____Guilt
____Admiration
____Contempt

____Fear
____Sympathy
____Pity

____Disgust
____Sadness
____Compassion

____Dislike
____Envy

12. Do you know of an American soldier who engaged in any of the following
actions in Iraq or Afghanistan? (Check all that apply)
____Seriously mistreated a civilian
____Seriously harmed a civilian
____Killed a civilian
13. If willing, please describe an incident you know of in a sentence or two.

__________________________________________________________________
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14. In your opinion, how common were such incidents?
Extremely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Uncommon

Extremely
Common

In answering the questions below, please have in mind the most serious incident
involving a civilian you know about or you have heard about. Please respond to all the
questions below with this soldier and incident in mind.
15. While still in Iraq or Afghanistan, to what extent do you think the American
soldier felt each of the following emotions? (Please select one number from the
scale for each emotion)

Not At All

Extremely

Relief

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilt

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Regret

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anger

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anxiety

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Shame

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Happiness

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Sadness

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. While still in Iraq or Afghanistan, how do you think the soldier judges his/her
behavior?
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

2

3

4

5

6

7

Justified

Unjustified

1
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17. When soldiers who engaged in such acts return to the U.S., do you think they
talk about such incidents?
_____Not at all

_____ Rarely

_____Sometimes

_____All the time

18. If they discussed the incident at all, who do you think they talk to about the
incident ?(Check all that apply)
_____ Someone from the chain – of – command, conducting debriefing
_____Friends who have served in the military
_____Friends who have not served in the military
_____Spouse
_____Parents
_____Siblings
_____Therapist
_____Other (Please specify)______________________

19. In general, do you think people who have not served in the military (American
civilians) are able to understand the occurrence of such an event?
_____Yes

______Somewhat

______No

20. Do you think the experience with the civilian changed the way the soldier
viewed him/herself while still deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan?
_____Not at all

_____Very little

_____Somewhat

______Definitely so

21. In your opinion, how often do you believe the soldier thinks about the incident
during their deployment?
_____Not at all

_____Very little _____Sometimes
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_____A lot

_____All the time

22. After returning to the U.S., to what extent do you think the American soldier
feels each of the following emotions? (Please select one number from the scale
for each emotion)
Not At All

Extremely

Relief

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilt

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Regret

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anger

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anxiety

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Shame

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Happiness

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Sadness

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

23. After returning to the U.S. and thinking about the incident, how do you think the
soldier judges his/her behavior?
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

2

3

4

5

6

7

Justified

Unjustified

1

24. After returning to the U.S., do you think the past experience with the civilian
changes the way the soldier views himself/herself?
_____Not at all
______Definitely so

_____Very little
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_____Somewhat

25. After returning to the US, how often do you think the soldier thinks about this
incident?
_____Not at all
_____All the time

_____Very little _____Sometimes

_____A lot

Please fill in the following information for you self
26. Gender:
27. Age:

____Male

____Female

____Years

28. To what extent do you approve of the Iraq war?
Strongly
1
Disapprove

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Approve

6

7

Strongly
Approve

29. To what extent do you approve of the Afghan war?
Strongly
1
Disapprove

2

3

4

5

Thank you for your participation. Please use the space below if you have any
comments you would like to make about the survey.

_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________

Please detach this page from the survey for your information.
We want to thank you for taking part in our study. We want to reiterate that we will take
all precautions to maintain your privacy and confidentiality. If you have further questions
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about this project or if you have a research-related problem, you may contact the
principal investigator, Ramila Usoof MS., at rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie JanoffBulman Ph.D. at (413)-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu or Melinda Novak, Chair
of the Psychology Department at (413)-545-5958 or mnovak@psych.umass.edu . If you
have any questions concerning your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) at
(413) 545-3428 or humansubjects@ora.umass.edu. If at any point, you wish to talk to
someone about any discomfort you may feel please contact Mental Health Services on
campus on 413-545-2337 or the psychological services center on 413-545-0041 or
contact the researchers, Ramila Usoof MS, rusoof@psych.umass.edu or Ronnie JanoffBulman Ph.D. at 413-545-0264 or janbul@psych.umass.edu. We will arrange for you to
meet with a clinician or therapist.

We, again, want to thank you for your participation and your service to our
country.

STUDY 3 MATERIAL
Condition: Individual X ingroup condition
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields.
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.
Army Specialist Nathan Jones was manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather
quiet street. He had spent several months as a US army soldier in this area. This area
wasn’t the safest; Jones felt tense. He already knew of several attacks in this
neighborhood and this knowledge made him pay closer attention to his surroundings.
The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of
young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a
rickety old bicycle.
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A few blocks away Abdul Al- Rahman left his compound with his wife. His car
was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street.
Army Specialist Jones was still manning the checkpoint when Abdul’s car approached it.
He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Jones held up his hand, his
palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at
a steady pace. Jones had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun to his shoulder and
shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped,
screeching and swerving as it did. Abdul was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the
passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned Abdul later explained, “When I saw the
soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling me to come
forward. I didn’t think it meant stop.”

Condition: group X ingroup condition
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields.
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.
A group of US soldiers were manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather quiet
street. They had spent several months in this area. This area wasn’t the safest; they felt
tense. They already knew of several attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge
made them pay closer attention to their surroundings. The possibility of an attack loomed
every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of young men walked by the check
point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.
A few blocks away an Iraqi left his compound with his wife. His car was old but
reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. The soldiers
were still manning the checkpoint when the Iraqi man’s car approached it. They noticed
an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. One of them held up his hand, his palm
facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a
steady pace. The soldiers had to decide quickly. In a flash a soldier raised his gun to his
shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but the
car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. The Iraqi was shot, but lived. His wife,
who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned man later explained,
“When I saw the soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling
me to come forward. I didn’t think it meant stop.”
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Condition: Individual X other affiliation
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields.
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.
Army Specialist Sergey Fedorov was manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather
quiet streetin Grozny, Chechnya. He had spent several months as a Russian army soldier
in this area. This area wasn’t the safest; Fedorov felt tense. He already knew of several
attacks in this neighborhood and this knowledge made him pay closer attention to his
surroundings. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every
time a group of young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the
checkpoint on a rickety old bicycle.
A few blocks away Arslan Ramdanov left his compound with his wife. His car
was old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street.
Army Specialist Fedorov was still manning the checkpoint when Arslan’s car approached
it. He noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. Fedorov held up his hand,
his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving
forward at a steady pace. Fedorov had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun to
his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but
the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. Arslan was shot, but lived. His wife,
who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned Arslan later explained,
“When I saw the soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought he was telling
me to come forward. I didn’t think it meant stop.”
Condition: Group X other affiliation
Two types of checkpoints are commonly used in modern day battlefields.
Permanent checkpoints are fixed. These permanent structures are a familiar sight and the
locals are familiar with their positioning. “Flash checkpoints” are different--they are set
up quickly, sometimes for as little as a few hours. It is often hard to pick out these
checkpoints; sometimes the soldiers have mobile barriers that they could use, sometimes
they are marked with a few cones, and sometimes they have to make do with a few large
stones that they spread across the street. They are especially hard to make out in the dark
of night. These checkpoints are important because they are designed to trap those
trafficking weapons or explosives, those violating military imposed curfews, or suspects
in bombings or drive-by-shootings.
A group of Russian soldiers were manning a temporary checkpoint on a rather
quiet street in Grozny, Russia. They had spent several months in this area. This area
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wasn’t the safest; they felt tense. They already knew of several attacks in this
neighborhood and this knowledge made them pay closer attention to their surroundings.
The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle passed by, every time a group of
young men walked by the check point, every time a man rode past the checkpoint on a
rickety old bicycle.
A few blocks away a Chechen man left his compound with his wife. His car was
old but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. The
soldiers were still manning the checkpoint when the Chechen man’s car approached it.
They noticed an old car carrying multiple occupants approach. One of them held up his
hand, his palm facing the car, but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving
forward at a steady pace. The soldiers had to decide quickly. In a flash a soldier raised his
gun to his shoulder and shot in the direction of the car. He wasn’t sure where the bullets
hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did. The Chechen was shot, but
lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed. The stunned man
later explained, “When I saw the soldier’s hand go up with his palm facing me, I thought
he was telling me to come forward. I didn’t think it meant stop.”
Condition: Individual X other (out of war context)
Bright yellow and black tape with the word ‘do not cross’ is often used to
demarcate crime scenes. However, sometimes when the area is too large, the police
would often set up a wooden barricades around the area. On this particular night the
police had set up barricades around a house where a drive by shooting had just taken
place. No one was injured and the family was still inside. The police wanted to make sure
there was no other incident that same night.
Nathan Jones, an off duty police officer was standing on the side walk on the now
quiet street. He had lived a long time in this area. After the incident this area didn’t feel
the safest; Jones felt tense. The possibility of an attack loomed every time a vehicle
passed by or every time a group of young men walked by the barricade.
A few blocks away Paul Jenkins left his compound with his wife. His car was old
but reliable. He slowly eased up on the gas and turned on to the busy street. Jones was
still standing on the sidewalk when Paul’s car approached it. He noticed an old car
carrying multiple occupants approach. Jones held up his hand, his palm facing the car,
but the driver did not seem to notice. The car kept moving forward at a steady pace. Jones
had to decide quickly. In a flash he raised his gun and shot in the direction of the car. He
wasn’t sure where the bullets hit, but the car stopped, screeching and swerving as it did.
Paul was shot, but lived. His wife, who was in the passenger seat, was shot and killed.
The stunned Paul later explained, “I wasn’t sure what the man was signaling me to do; I
thought he might be beckoning me to drive up to the barricade.
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Please respond to the following questions by circling the number that best describes
how you feel.
How justified was the soldier(s) / police officer in shooting at the car?
Not at
all
justified
1

Somewhat
justified
2

3

4

5

Completely
justified
6

7

8

9

In your opinion how good or bad would you rate the soldier(s)’s / police officer’s
behavior?
Bad
1

2

3

4

Not
sure
5

Good
6

7

8

9

In your opinion how moral or immoral would you rate the soldier(s)’s / police
officer’s behavior?
Immoral
1

2

3

4

Not
sure
5

Moral
6

7

8

9

8

Should
be
punished
severely
9

Do you think the soldier(s) / police officer should be punished?
Should
not be
punished
at all
1

Not
sure

2

3

4

5

6

7

How empathic do you feel toward soldier(s) / police officer?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
empathic
5

6

7

8

Extremely
empathic
9

8

Extremely
empathic
9

How empathic do you feel toward the driver of the vehicle?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
empathic
5
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6

7

How blameworthy do you think the soldier(s) / police officer for the death?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
blameworthy
5

6

7

8

Completely
blameworthy
9

How blameworthy do you the driver is for the death?
Completely
Not at
Somewhat
blameworthy
all
blameworthy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
How guilty do you think the soldier(s) / police officer feel(s) for the death of the
woman?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
blameworthy
5

6

7

8

Completely
blameworthy
9

Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you felt
when you read the description.

Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7

Sad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Proud

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disgust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Surprise

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Angry
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We are interested in your reactions to what the soldier(s) / police officer did. Using
the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents to how you view
the soldier(s)’s / police officer’s behavior.
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

Unacceptable1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Acceptable

Inexcusable 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Excusable

Dishonest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

Irresponsible 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Responsible

Uncommon

2

3

4

5

6

7

Common

1

STUDY 4 MATERIAL

Please read the following event description
Supply convoys are ubiquitous in Iraq. They usually consist of 20 to 30 trucks and
military escort vehicles that can extend for as long as a mile. The trucks have a Humvee
military escort in front and back and at least one in the center. Soldiers and Marines also
often accompany the drivers in the cabs of tractor–trailers.
When the columns of vehicles leave their heavily fortified compounds, they
usually have to drive fast and make sure that they are moving constantly. Veterans say it
is common for insurgents to attempt to slow convoys down or halt them before an attack
by sending civilian vehicles to create a traffic jam. Sometimes insurgents toss explosive
devices from vehicles or pack explosives into vehicles that detonate with the driver upon
impact with a convoy vehicle. The troops live in a world where remaining stationary can
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mean death, and constant movement is seen as essential to survival. Convoys, because
they are large, lumbering targets, place a premium on constant movement.
Because of the chaos in Iraq and the sudden appearance of rapidly moving
convoys, troops often saw panicked Iraqi drivers desperately attempting to get their
vehicles out of the way of the huge trucks. But given soldiers’ experiences, any Iraqi
vehicles that passed the convoy or moved into spaces between the convoy vehicles still
had to be viewed with great suspicion.

Solve the following 10 anagrams
TREASON

_____________________

WREATHE

_____________________

THICKENS

_____________________

RELATION

_____________________

RECITALS

_____________________

POINTERS

_____________________

NAMELESS

_____________________

VIEWERS

_____________________

This is a continuation of the event description you were reading, previously. Please
complete reading it before you respond to the questions below.
Army Specialist Jonathan Smith was sitting on a tall stool in the dimly lit bar drinking a
cold beer. His friends Matt and Ron were seated not far from him, talking loudly trying to
make themselves heard over the general din of the bar. As he sat there finishing his beer,
Jonathan remembered that warm summer day about one month ago, just before he
returned home. He was heading down a dangerous four-lane highway nicknamed RPG
Alley at the front of a slow-moving military convoy. He knew he had to be extra
watchful, knowing that convoys had frequently come under attack along this stretch of
road. As they rumbled along he tried to focus on the Iraqis along the route and the
vehicles that swerved to get out of the way of the convoy. Iraqi civilians were supposed
to understand that getting in the way of a convoy could be dangerous; there had been
numerous instances when drivers had been shot at.
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As they rumbled along, Army Specialist Smith noticed a new blue sedan
attempting to pass the convoy. The driver didn’t seem to pay attention to the convoy.
Rather he continued to drive right past the vehicles of the convoy. For a moment Smith
was stunned as he watched the car approach. He fired at the car, causing the driver, an
Iraqi man, to slam on his brakes. The convoy did not stop to survey the damage. The man
was shot and seriously wounded. He started sobbing and explained why he had attempted
to overtake the convoy: “I was just going to the hospital to see my newborn son. I was in
a hurry, so I tried to pass the trucks, and they shot me.”

This is a continuation of the event description you were reading, previously. Please
complete reading it before you respond to the questions below.
Army Specialist Jonathan Smith was sitting on a tall stool in the dimly lit bunker drinking
his beer. His friends Matt and Ron were seated not far from him. They were talking rather
loudly to make themselves heard over the rumbling of vehicles above, outside the bunker.
As he sat there finishing his beer, Jonathan remembered that warm summer day about a
month before. He was heading down a dangerous four-lane highway nicknamed RPG
Alley at the front of a slow-moving military convoy. He knew he had to be extra
watchful, knowing that convoys had frequently come under attack along this stretch of
road. As they rumbled along he tried to focus on the Iraqis along the route and the
vehicles that swerved to get out of the way of the convoy. Iraqi civilians were supposed
to understand that getting in the way of a convoy could be dangerous; there had been
numerous instances when drivers had been shot at.
As they rumbled along, Army Specialist Smith noticed a new blue sedan
attempting to pass the convoy. The driver didn’t seem to pay attention to the convoy.
Rather he continued to drive right past the vehicles of the convoy. For a moment Smith
was stunned as he watched the car approach. He fired at the car, causing the driver, an
Iraqi man, to slam on his brakes. The convoy did not stop to survey the damage. The man
was shot and seriously wounded. He started sobbing and explained why he had attempted
to overtake the convoy: “I was just going to the hospital to see my newborn son. I was in
a hurry, so I tried to pass the trucks, and they shot me.”
Imagine you are Army Specialist Jonathan Smith. Respond to the following scales
by circling the number that best reflects how you feel.
How justified do you think you would feel in shooting at the car?
Not at
all
justified
1

Somewhat
justified
2

3

4

5
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Completely
justified
6

7

8

9

In your opinion how good or bad would you feel ?
Bad
1

2

3

Not
sure
5

4

Good
6

7

8

9

In your opinion how moral or immoral would you feel you are?
Immoral
1

2

3

4

Not
sure
5

Moral
6

7

8

9

How empathic would you feel toward the driver of the vehicle?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
empathic
5

6

7

8

Extremely
empathic
9

How blameworthy do you think you would feel about the death?
Not at
all
1

2

3

Somewhat
blameworthy
5

4

6

7

8

Completely
blameworthy
9

How guilty do you think you would be about the shooting?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
guilty
5

6

7

8

Completely
guilty
9

How ashamed do you think you would be about the shooting?
Not at
Somewhat
Completely
all
ashamed
ashamed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you
would feel about having shot at the man
Extremely

Not at all
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Angry

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Sad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Proud

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disgust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Surprise

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please circle the number that best corresponds to how you would perceive your
behavior if you were Army Specialist Jonathan Smith’s situation.
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

Unacceptable1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Acceptable

Inexcusable 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Excusable

Dishonest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

Irresponsible 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Responsible

Respond to the following scales by circling the number that best reflects how you
feel about Army Specialist Jonathan Smith.
How justified do you think Army Specialist Smith was in shooting at the car?
Not at

Somewhat
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Completely

all
justified
1

justified
2

3

4

5

justified
6

7

8

9

In your opinion how good or bad is Army Specialist Smith?
Bad
1

2

3

Not
sure
5

4

Good
6

7

8

9

In your opinion how moral or immoral is Army Specialist Smith?
Immoral
1

2

3

4

Not
sure
5

Moral
6

7

8

9

How empathic are you toward the driver of the vehicle?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
empathic
5

6

7

8

Extremely
empathic
9

How blameworthy do you think Army Specialist Smith is for the death?
Not at
all
1

2

3

Somewhat
blameworthy
5

4

6

7

8

Completely
blameworthy
9

How guilty do you think Army Specialist Smith would be about the shooting?
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
guilty
5

6

7

8

Completely
guilty
9

How ashamed do you think Army Specialist Smith would be about the shooting?
Not at
Somewhat
Completely
all
ashamed
ashamed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Please circle a number on the following scale that appropriately reflects how you
feel about Army Specialist Smith.
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Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
7

Sad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Proud

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Disgust

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fear

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Surprise

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Angry

Please circle the number that best corresponds to how you perceive Army Specialist
Smith’s behavior
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

Unacceptable1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Acceptable

Inexcusable 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Excusable

Dishonest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

Irresponsible 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Responsible

Demographic questionnaire
1. Gender:

Male
Female
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2. Age:

3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one)
African American
Middle Eastern
Cape Verdean

Asian American
Native American

Hispanic
White

Other (specify)

4. What is your religion? (Please circle one)
Buddhism
Islam

Catholicism
Judaism

Christianity

Other (specify)
5. How many years of schooling have you completed?
Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Other
6. How would you describe your political affiliation?
Democrat

Republican

Independent

STUDY 5 MATERIAL

Please read the following paragraph, carefully and respond to the questions below.
John, a freshman at the University of Massachusetts, plagiarized over half of a
paper that he was assigned to do for an English class. Almost six full pages were copied
word for word from the original source. The paper was assigned as part of a final group
project. Before the paper was due, the course professor informed the class that students
would receive a group grade for this final project. Each student in the group selected a
different author to examine. John said that he only plagiarized the paper so that his group
would get a good grade on it. He had had a rough week and was unable to do the amount
of work that was required for an excellent paper. So instead of getting a bad grade by
writing a terrible paper, John decided it would be better if he used some information he
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had found in the library. John plagiarized but was not caught, and his group got a very
good grade on the final project.

How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
justified
justified
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Completely
justified
8

9

How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
blameworthy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
guilty
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Completely
blameworthy
9

8

Completely
guilty
9

How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
ashamed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Completely
ashamed
9

How guilty do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
guilty
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Completely
guilty
9

How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
Completely
all
ashamed
ashamed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

We are interested in your reactions to what John did. There are no right or wrong
answers. Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents
to how you view his behavior.
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good
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Unacceptable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Acceptable

Inexcusable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Excusable

Dishonest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

Irresponsible

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Responsible

For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you
think about John in this case.
Extremely
Not at all
Competent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Sociable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Well-intentioned

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Skillful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Trustworthy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good-natured

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Friendly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Confident

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Intelligent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Warm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Gender:

Male
Female

2. Age:

3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one)
African American
Middle Eastern
Cape Verdean

Asian American
Native American
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Hispanic
White

Other (specify)

4. What is your religion? (Please circle one)
Buddhism
Islam

Catholicism
Judaism

Protestant

Other (specify)

5. How would you describe your political affiliation?
Democrat

Republican

Independent

Thank you!
Please read the following paragraph, carefully and respond to the questions below.
John, a freshman at the University of Massachusetts, plagiarized over half of a
paper that he was assigned to do for an English class. Almost six full pages were copied
word for word from the original source. The paper was assigned as part of a final group
project. Each student in the class selected a different author to examine. John said that he
only plagiarized the paper in order to get a good grade on it. He had had a rough week
and was unable to do the amount of work that was required for an excellent paper. So
instead of getting a bad grade by writing a terrible paper, John decided it would be better
if he used some information he had found in the library. John plagiarized but was not
caught, and he got a very good grade on the final project.
How justified do you think John was in plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
justified
justified
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Completely
justified
8

How blameworthy do you think John was for plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
blameworthy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
How guilty do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
guilty
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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8

9

Completely
blameworthy
9

Completely
guilty
9

How ashamed do you think John feels about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
ashamed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Completely
ashamed
9

How guilty do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
all
guilty
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Completely
guilty
9

How ashamed do you think John should feel about plagiarizing his paper?
Not at
Somewhat
Completely
all
ashamed
ashamed
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

We are interested in your reactions to what John did. There are no right or wrong
answers. Using the scales below, please circle the number that best correspondents
to how you view his behavior.
Immoral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

Wrong

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Right

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

Unacceptable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Acceptable

Inexcusable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Excusable

Dishonest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

Irresponsible

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Responsible

For each trait listed below, please circle the number that best indicates what you
think about John in this case.
Not at all
Extremely
Competent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Sociable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Well-intentioned

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Skillful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Trustworthy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good-natured

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Friendly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Confident

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Moral

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Intelligent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Warm

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honest

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Gender:

Male
Female

2. Age:

3. What ethnic group do you identify with the most? ( Please circle one)
African American
Middle Eastern
Cape Verdean

Asian American
Native American

Hispanic
White

Other (specify)

4. What is your religion? (Please circle one)
Buddhism
Islam

Catholicism
Judaism

Protestant

Other (specify)

5. How would you describe your political affiliation?
Democrat

Republican

Thank you!
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Independent
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